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Abstract
We conducted preregistered replications of 28 classic and contemporary published findings, with protocols that were 
peer reviewed in advance, to examine variation in effect magnitudes across samples and settings. Each protocol was 
administered to approximately half of 125 samples that comprised 15,305 participants from 36 countries and territories. 
Using the conventional criterion of statistical significance (p < .05), we found that 15 (54%) of the replications provided 
evidence of a statistically significant effect in the same direction as the original finding. With a strict significance 
criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the replications still provided such evidence, a reflection of the extremely high-
powered design. Seven (25%) of the replications yielded effect sizes larger than the original ones, and 21 (75%) yielded 
effect sizes smaller than the original ones. The median comparable Cohen’s ds were 0.60 for the original findings 
and 0.15 for the replications. The effect sizes were small (< 0.20) in 16 of the replications (57%), and 9 effects (32%) 
were in the direction opposite the direction of the original effect. Across settings, the Q statistic indicated significant 
heterogeneity in 11 (39%) of the replication effects, and most of those were among the findings with the largest 
overall effect sizes; only 1 effect that was near zero in the aggregate showed significant heterogeneity according to 
this measure. Only 1 effect had a tau value greater than .20, an indication of moderate heterogeneity. Eight others had 
tau values near or slightly above .10, an indication of slight heterogeneity. Moderation tests indicated that very little 
heterogeneity was attributable to the order in which the tasks were performed or whether the tasks were administered 
in lab versus online. Exploratory comparisons revealed little heterogeneity between Western, educated, industrialized, 
rich, and democratic (WEIRD) cultures and less WEIRD cultures (i.e., cultures with relatively high and low WEIRDness 
scores, respectively). Cumulatively, variability in the observed effect sizes was attributable more to the effect being 
studied than to the sample or setting in which it was studied.
Keywords
social psychology, cognitive psychology, replication, culture, individual differences, sampling effects, situational 
effects, meta-analysis, Registered Report, open data, open materials, preregistered
Suppose a researcher, Josh, conducts an experiment 
and finds that academic performance is reduced among 
participants who experience threat compared with 
those in a control condition. Another researcher, Nina, 
conducts the same study at her institution and finds no 
effect. Person- and situation-based explanations of the 
discrepancy may come to mind immediately: Nina may 
have used a sample that differed in important ways 
from Josh’s sample, and the situational context in Nina’s 
lab might have differed in theoretically important but 
nonobvious ways from the context in Josh’s lab. Both 
explanations could be true. A less interesting, but real, 
possibility is that one of the researchers made an error 
in design or procedure that the other did not. Finally, 
it is possible that the different results are a function of 
sampling error: Nina’s result could be a false negative, 
or Josh’s result could be a false positive. The present 
research provides evidence toward understanding the 
contribution of variation in samples and settings to 
observed variation in psychological effects.
Accounting for Variation in Effects: 
Person and Situation Variation, or 
Sampling Error?
There is a body of research providing evidence that 
experimental effects are influenced by variation in person 
characteristics and experimental context (Lewin, 1936; 
Ross & Nisbett, 1991). For example, people tend to attri-
bute behavior to characteristics of the person rather than 
characteristics of the situation (e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 
1995; Jones & Harris, 1967), but some evidence suggests 
that this effect is stronger in Western than in Eastern 
cultures (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002). A common model 
of investigating psychological processes is to identify an 
effect and then investigate moderating influences that 
make the effect stronger or weaker. Therefore, when 
similar experiments yield different outcomes, the readily 
available conclusion is that a moderating influence 
accounts for the difference. However, if effects vary less 
across samples and settings than is assumed in the psy-
chological literature, then the assumptions of moderation 
may be overapplied and the role of sampling error may 
be underestimated.
If effects are highly variable across samples and set-
tings, then variation in effect sizes will routinely exceed 
what would be expected to result from sampling error. In 
this circumstance, the lack of consistency between Josh’s 
and Nina’s results is unlikely to influence beliefs about 
the original effect. Moreover, if there are many influential 
factors, then it is difficult to isolate moderators and iden-
tify the conditions necessary to obtain the effect. In this 
case, the lack of consistency between Josh’s and Nina’s 
results might produce collective indifference—there are 
just too many variables to know why there was a differ-
ence, so the different results produce no change in under-
standing of the phenomenon.
Alternatively, variations in effect sizes may not 
exceed what would be expected to result from sampling 
error. In this case, observed differences in effects do 
not indicate moderating influences of sample or setting. 
Rather, imprecision in estimation is the sole source of 
variation and requires no causal explanation.
In the case of Josh’s and Nina’s results, it is not nec-
essarily easy to assess whether the inconsistency is due 
to sampling error or moderation, especially if their stud-
ies had small samples (Morey & Lakens, 2016). With 
small samples, Josh’s positive result and Nina’s null 
result will likely have confidence intervals that overlap 
each other, so that one can conclude little other than 
that “more data are needed.”
The difference between these interpretations regard-
ing the source of the inconsistency is substantial, but 
there is little direct evidence regarding the extent to 
which persons and situations—samples and settings—
influence the size of psychological effects in general 
(but see Coppock, in press; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; 
Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015). The 
default assumption is that psychological effects are 
awash in interactions among many variables. The pres-
ent report follows up on initial evidence from the Many 
Labs projects (Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2014a). 
The first Many Labs project (Klein et al., 2014a) repli-
cated 13 classic and contemporary psychological effects 
with 36 different samples and settings (N = 6,344). The 
results showed that (a) variation in sample and setting 
had little impact on observed effect magnitudes; (b) 
when there was variation in effect magnitude across 
samples, it occurred in studies with large effects, not 
in studies with small effects; and (c) overall, effect-size 
estimates were more related to the effect studied than 
to the sample or setting in which it was studied, includ-
ing the nation in which the data were collected and 
whether they were collected in the lab or over the Web.
A limitation of the first Many Labs project is that it 
included a small number of effects and there was no 
reason to presume that they varied substantially across 
samples and settings. It is possible that the included 
effects are more robust and homogeneous than typical 
behavioral phenomena, or that the populations were 
more homogeneous than initially expected. The present 
research substantially expanded the first Many Labs 
study design by including (a) more effects, (b) some 
effects that are presumed to vary across samples or 
settings, (c) more labs, and (d) diverse samples. The 
effects were not randomly selected, nor are they rep-
resentative, but they do cover a wide range of topics. 
This study provides preliminary evidence for the extent 
to which variation in effect magnitude is attributable to 
sample and setting, as opposed to sampling error.
Other Influences on Observed Effects
Across systematic replication efforts in the social-
behavioral sciences, there is accumulating evidence that 
replication of published effects is less frequent than 
might be expected, and that replication effect sizes are 
typically smaller than original effect sizes (Camerer et al., 
2016; Camerer et al., 2018; Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein 
et  al., 2014a; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). For 
example, Camerer et al. (2018) successfully replicated 
13 of 21 social science studies published in Science and 
Nature. Among the failures to replicate, the average 
effect size was approximately 0, but even among the 
successful replications, the average effect size was about 
75% of what was observed in the original experiments. 
Failures to replicate can be due to errors in the replica-
tion or to unanticipated moderation by changes in sam-
ple and setting, as we investigated in the project reported 
here. They can also occur because of pervasive low-
powered research plus publication bias that favors posi-
tive over negative results (Button et al., 2013; Cohen, 
1962; Greenwald, 1975; Rosenthal, 1979) and because of 
questionable research practices, such as p-hacking, that 
can inflate the likelihood of obtaining false positives 
( John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; Simmons, Nelson, 
& Simonsohn, 2011). These other reasons for failure to 
replicate, which can also contribute to replication effect 
sizes being weaker than those originally observed, were 
not investigated directly in the present research.
Origins of the Study Design
To obtain a list of candidate effects for this project, we 
held a round of open nominations, inviting submission 
of any effect that fit the defined criteria (see the Coor-
dinating Proposal, available at https://osf.io/uazdm/). 
Those nominations were supplemented by ideas from 
the project team and by suggestions received in 
response to direct queries sent to independent experts 
in psychological science.
The nominated studies were evaluated individually 
on the following criteria: (a) feasibility of implementa-
tion through a Web browser, (b) brevity of study pro-
cedures (shorter procedures were desired), (c) number 
of citations (more citations desired), (d) identifiability 
of a meaningful two-condition experimental design or 
simple correlation as the target of replication (with 
experiments favored), (e) general interest value of the 
effect, and (f) applicability to samples of adults. The 
nominated studies were also evaluated collectively to 
ensure diversity on several criteria. Specifically, we 
wanted to include (a) both effects that had demon-
strated replicability across multiple samples and set-
tings and others that had not been examined across 
multiple samples and settings,1 (b) both effects that 
were known to be sensitive to sample or setting and 
others for which variation was unknown or assumed 
to be minimal, (c) both classic and contemporary 
effects, (d) effects covering a broad range of topical 
areas in social and cognitive psychology, (e) effects 
observed in studies conducted by a variety of 
research groups, and (f ) effects that had been pub-
lished in diverse outlets.
More than 100 effects were nominated as potentially 
fitting these criteria. A subset of the project team reviewed 
these effects with the aim of maximizing the number of 
included effects and the diversity of the total slate on 
these criteria. No specific researcher’s work was selected 
for replication because of beliefs or concerns about the 
researcher or the effects he or she had reported, but 
some topical areas and authors were included more than 
once because they provided short, simple, interesting 
effects that met the selection criteria.
Once an effect was selected for inclusion, a member 
of the research team contacted the corresponding 
author (if he or she was alive) to obtain original study 
materials and get advice about adapting the procedure 
for this use. In particular, original authors were asked 
if there were moderators or other limitations to obtain-
ing the targeted result that would be useful for the team 
to understand in advance and, perhaps, anticipate in 
data collection.
In some cases, correspondence with the original 
authors identified limitations of the selected effect that 
reduced its applicability for the present design. In those 
cases, we worked with the original authors to identify 
alternative studies or decided to remove the effect 
entirely from the selected set and replace it with one 
of the available alternatives.
We split the studies into two slates that would require 
about 30 min each for participants to complete. We 
included 32 effects in total before peer review and pilot 
testing. In only one instance did the original authors 
express strong concerns about their effect being 
included in this project. Because we make no claim 
about the sample of studies being randomly selected 
or representative, we removed that effect from the proj-
ect. With 31 effects remaining, we pilot-tested both 
slates, with the authors and members of their labs as 
participants, to ensure that each slate could be com-
pleted within 30 min. We observed that we underesti-
mated the time required for the tasks needed to test a 
few effects. As a consequence, we had to remove three 
effects (i.e., those originally reported by Ashton-James, 
Maddux, Galinsky, & Chartrand, 2009; Srull & Wyer, 
1979; and Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, & Mussweiler, 2011), 
shorten or remove a few individual difference mea-
sures, and slightly reorganize the slates. The final set 
comprised 28 effects, which were divided between the 
slates to balance them on the criteria listed earlier and 
to avoid substantial overlap in topics within a slate (for 
a list of the effects in each slate, along with citation 
counts for the original publications, see Table A1 in the 
appendix).
Following the Registered Report model (Nosek & 
Lakens, 2014), prior to data collection we submitted the 
materials and protocols to formal peer review in a pro-
cess conducted by this journal’s Editor.
Disclosures
Preregistration
The accepted design was preregistered on the Open 
Science Framework (OSF), at https://osf.io/ejcfw/.
Data, materials, and online resources
Comprehensive materials, data, and supplementary 
information about the project are available at https://
osf.io/8cd4r/. Deviations from the preregistered descrip-
tion of the project and its implementation are recorded 
in supplementary materials at https://osf.io/7mqba/. 
Changes to analysis plans are noted with justification, 
and results of the original and revised analytic 
approaches are compared, in supplementary materials 
at https://osf.io/4rbh9/. Table 1 provides a summary of 
known differences from the original studies and changes 
in the analysis plan. A guide to the data-analysis code 
is available at https://manylabsopenscience.github.io/.
Measures
We report how we determined our sample size, all data 
exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the 
study.
Ethical approval
This research was conducted in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki and followed local requirements 
for the institutional review board’s approval at each of 
the data-collection sites.
Method
Participants
An open invitation to participate as a data-collection 
site in Many Labs 2 was issued in early 2014. To be 
Table 1. Summary of Differences From the Original Studies and Changes to the Preregistered Analysis Plan
Effect Known differences from the original study Change to analysis plan
1.  Cardinal direction and socioeconomic
status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)
Study was administered online rather than with 
paper and pencil, and the effect of the orientation 
difference was tested by using tablets at some sites
None
2.  Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay,
Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)
None known None
3.  Disfluency engages analytic processing
(Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre,
2007)
Study was administered online rather than with 
paper and pencil
None
4.  Moral foundations of liberals versus
conservatives (Graham, Haidt, &
Nosek, 2009)
The political-ideology item was changed to use 
regionally appropriate terms for the left and right 
in place of the U.S.-centric terms “liberal” and 
“conservative”; the analysis strategy was simplified
None
5.  Affect and risk (Rottenstreich &
Hsee, 2001)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study may have used paper and pencil
None
6.  Consumerism undermines trust
(Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, &
Bodenhausen, 2012)
None known None
7.  Correspondence bias (Miyamoto &
Kitayama, 2002)
The study was administered online rather than 
with paper and pencil; the names and location 
referred to in the materials were altered to be 
familiar to each sample; the essay prompt was 
changed to match the legal status of capital 
punishment in the nation; a minimum 10-s delay 
before advancing to the next task was added 
to increase likelihood of reading the essay; the 
low-diagnosticity condition was removed
None
8.  Disgust sensitivity predicts
homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe,
& Bloom, 2009)
The 5-item Contamination Disgust subscale of the 
modern 25-item Disgust Scale–Revised (DS-R; 
Olatunji et al. 2007) was used instead of the 
original 8-item measure
None
9.  Influence of incidental anchors
on judgment (Critcher & Gilovich,
2008)
The study was administered online rather than 
with paper and pencil, and the effect of this 
difference was tested by using paper and 
pencil at 11 sites; markets were matched to the 
location of data collection; the pictures of the 
smartphones were updated
None
10.  Social value orientation and family
size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, &
Joireman, 1997)
The study was administered online rather than with 
paper and pencil; social value orientation was 
measured with a modern scale instead of the 
original categorical measure
None
11.  Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of
double effect (Hauser, Cushman,
Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007)
A subset of the scenarios was used Fisher’s exact test was used 
instead of chi-square, to obtain 
two-sided results in which 
negative values indicated an 
effect opposite the original
12.  Sociometric status and well-being
(Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, &
Keltner, 2012)
The high- and low-socioeconomic-status 
conditions were removed
None
13.  False consensus: supermarket scenario
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study likely used paper and pencil
None
14.  False consensus: traffic-ticket
scenario (Ross et al., 1977)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study likely used paper and pencil
None
15.  Vertical position and power
(Giessner & Schubert, 2007)
The salary of the hypothetical manager was 
converted to local currency and adjusted to be 
relevant for each sample
None
(continued)
Effect Known differences from the original study Change to analysis plan
16.  Effect of framing on decision
making (Tversky & Kahneman,
1981)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study likely used paper and pencil; 
dollar amounts were adjusted, and consumer 
items were replaced to be appropriate for 2014; 
currency was converted and adjusted to be 
relevant for each sample
Fisher’s exact test was used 
instead of chi-square, to obtain 
two-sided results in which 
negative values indicated an 
effect opposite the original
17.  Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of
double effect (Hauser et al., 2007)
A subset of the scenarios was used Fisher’s exact test was used 
instead of chi-square, to obtain 
two-sided results in which 
negative values indicated an 
effect opposite the original
18.  Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen &
Gilovich, 2008)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study likely used paper and pencil; the 
condition in which the protagonist was not the 
participant was removed
None
19.  Construing actions as choices
(Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, &
Berlia, 2010)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study may have used paper and pencil; 
a separate effect size was estimated for each 
sample
Asymptotic rather than exact, 
noncentral confidence 
intervals were calculated
20.  Preferences for formal versus
intuitive reasoning (Norenzayan,
Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002)
Participants categorized objects by selecting from 
a multiple-choice list; random assignment to 
condition was balanced (assignment in the 
original study was 2/3:1/3); the practice trial 
was removed
None
21. Less-is-better effect (Hsee, 1998) The study was administered online, but the 
original study may have used paper and pencil; 
currency was converted and adjusted to be 
relevant for each sample
None
22.  Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner,
2009)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study may have used paper and pencil
None
23.  Moral violations and desire for
cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist,
2006)
The study was administered online rather than 
with paper and pencil; participants typed rather 
than hand-copied an adapted version of the 
story; the study was purported to be measuring 
both personality and typing speed
None
24.  Assimilation and contrast effects
in question sequences (Schwarz,
Strack, & Mai, 1991)
The study was administered online rather than 
with paper and pencil
None
25.  Effect of choosing versus rejecting
on relative desirability (Shafir, 1993)
The study was administered online rather than 
with paper and pencil; the order in which 
the two parents were presented was not 
counterbalanced
Effect size was estimated directly 
from the key z test rather 
than with a logistic regression 
model
26.  Priming “heat” increases belief in
global warming (Zaval, Keenan,
Johnson, & Weber, 2014)
The original study began with a question about 
the current temperature followed by a 10-
min delay; this question and the delay were 
dropped from the replication
Participants who made errors in 
sentence unscrambling were 
excluded on the recommendation 
of the original authors
27.  Perceived intentionality for side
effects (Knobe, 2003)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study may have used paper and pencil; 
the dependent variable was changed from a 
“yes”/“no” response to a 7-point agreement scale
None
28.  Directionality and similarity
(Tversky & Gati, 1978)
The study was administered online, but the 
original study likely used paper and pencil; 
nations were updated (Ceylon to Sri Lanka, 
West Germany to Germany, and U.S.S.R. to 
Russia)
Additional mixed models 
were conducted (see the 
supplemental information at 
https://osf.io/4rbh9/)
Note: Additional descriptions and supplementary analyses are available in Supplementary Notes (https://osf.io/4rbh9/). Full descriptions of known 
differences from the original studies are provided in the preregistered protocol at https://osf.io/ejcfw/; for example, the protocol makes note of 
additional experimental conditions and outcome variables that were part of the original studies but not included in the replications. Differences 
from the original studies were suggested by the original authors or reviewed and approved during peer review. In all cases, the replication 
samples and settings differed from the original studies. These differences included the fact that the studies were administered sequentially in a 
slate in the replication project. The order effect is evaluated directly in the Results section.
Table 1. (Continued)
eligible for inclusion, labs had to agree to administer 
their assigned study procedure to at least 80 partici-
pants and to collect data from as many as was feasible. 
Labs decided to stop data collection on the basis of 
their access to participants and time constraints. None 
had opportunity to observe the outcomes prior to the 
conclusion of data collection. All contributors who met 
the design and data-collection requirements received 
authorship on this final report. Upon completion of 
data collection, there were 125 total samples (64 for 
Slate 1 and 61 for Slate 2; 15 sites collected data for 
both slates), and the cumulative sample size was 15,305 
(mean n = 122.44, median = 99, SD = 92.71, range = 
16–841).
For 79 samples, data were collected in person (typi-
cally in the lab, though tasks were completed on the 
Internet), and for 46 samples, data collections was 
entirely Web based. Thirty-nine of the samples were 
from the United States, and the 86 others were from 
Australia (n = 2); Austria (n = 2); Belgium (n = 2); Brazil 
(n = 1); Canada (n = 4); Chile (n = 3); China (n = 5); 
Colombia (n = 1); Costa Rica (n = 2); the Czech Repub-
lic (n = 3); France (n = 2); Germany (n = 4); Hong 
Kong, China (n = 3); Hungary (n = 1); India (n = 5); 
Italy (n = 1); Japan (n = 1); Malaysia (n = 1); Mexico 
(n = 1); The Netherlands (n = 9); New Zealand (n = 2); 
Nigeria (n = 1); Poland (n = 6); Portugal (n = 1); Serbia 
(n = 3); South Africa (n = 3); Spain (n = 2); Sweden 
(n = 1); Switzerland (n = 1); Taiwan (n = 1); Tanzania 
(n = 2); Turkey (n = 3); the United Arab Emirates (n = 
2); the United Kingdom (n = 4); and Uruguay (n = 1). 
Details about each site of data collection are available 
at https://osf.io/uv4qx/.
Of the participants who responded to demographics 
questions in Slate 1, 34.5% were men, 64.4% were 
women, 0.3% selected “other,” and 0.8% selected “prefer 
not to answer.” The average age for Slate 1 participants 
(after excluding responses greater than “100”) was 22.37 
(SD = 7.09). Of the participants in Slate 2, 35.9% were 
men, 62.9% were women, 0.4% selected “other,” and 
0.8% selected “prefer not to answer.” The average age 
for Slate 2 participants (after excluding responses 
greater than “100”) was 23.34 (SD = 8.28). Variation in 
demographic characteristics across the samples is docu-
mented at https://osf.io/g3bza/.
Procedure
The tasks were administered over the Internet for pur-
poses of standardization across locations. At some loca-
tions, participants completed the survey in a lab or 
room on computers or tablets, whereas in other loca-
tions, participants completed the survey entirely online 
at their own convenience. Surveys were created in 
Qualtrics software (qualtrics.com), and a unique link 
to run the studies was sent to each data-collection team 
so that we could track the origin of data. Each site was 
assigned an identifier. These identifiers can be found 
under the “source” variable in the public data set (avail-
able at https://osf.io/8cd4r/).
Data were deposited to a central database and ana-
lyzed together. Each team created a video simulation 
of study administration to illustrate the features of the 
data-collection setting. Labs that used a language other 
than English completed a translation of the study mate-
rials and then a back-translation to check that the origi-
nal meaning was retained (cf. Brislin, 1970). Labs 
decided themselves the language that was appropriate 
for their sample and adapted materials so that the con-
tent would be appropriate for their sample (e.g., some 
labs edited monetary units).
Labs were assigned to slates so as to maximize the 
national diversity for both slates. If there was only one 
lab in a given country, it was randomly assigned to a 
slate using a tool available at random.org. If there was 
more than one lab for a country, the labs were also 
randomly assigned to slates using a tool available at 
random.org, but with the constraint that the labs were 
evenly distributed across slates as closely as possible 
(e.g., two labs in each slate if there were four labs in 
that country). Near the beginning of data collection, we 
recruited some additional Asian sites specifically for 
Slate 1 to increase its sample diversity. The slates were 
administered by a single experiment script that began 
with informed consent, next presented the appropriate 
tasks in an order that was fully randomized across par-
ticipants, then presented the individual difference mea-
sures in randomized order, and closed with demographics 
measures and debriefing (see Table A2 in the appendix 
for a list of the demographic, data-quality, and individual 
difference measures included, with citation counts).
Demographics
Demographic information was collected so that we 
could characterize each sample and explore possible 
moderation. Participants were free to decline to answer 
any question.
Age. Participants noted their age in years in an open-
response box.
Sex. Participants selected “male,” “female,” “other,” or 
“prefer not to answer” to indicate their biological sex.
Race-ethnicity. Participants indicated their race-ethnicity 
by selecting from a drop-down menu populated with 
options determined by the lead researcher for each site. 
Participants could also select “other” or write an open 
response. Note that response items were not standard-
ized, as different countries have very different conceptu-
alizations of race and ethnicity.
Cultural origins. Three items assessed cultural origins. 
Each used a drop-down menu populated by a list of 
countries or territories and an “other” option with an 
open-response box. The three items were as follows: (a) 
“In which country/region were you born?”; (b) “In which 
country/region was your primary caregiver (e.g., parent, 
grandparent) born?”; and (c) “If you had a second pri-
mary caregiver, in which country/region was he or she 
born?”
Hometown. All participants were asked to indicate their 
hometown (“What is the name of your home town/city?”) 
in an open-response box. This item was included for 
possible future examination as a potential moderator of 
Huang, Tse, and Cho’s (2014) effect.
Location of wealth in hometown. Another item asked, 
“Where do wealthier people live in your home town/
city?” The response options were “north,” “south,” and 
“neither.” This item was included as a potential moderator 
of Huang et  al.’s (2014) effect and appeared in Slate 1 
only.
Political ideology. Participants rated their political ideol-
ogy on a scale with response options of “strongly left-wing,” 
“moderately left-wing,” “slightly left-wing,” “moderate,” 
“slightly right-wing,” “moderately right-wing,” and “strongly 
right-wing.” Instructions were adapted for each country to 
ensure this measure’s relevance to the local context. For 
example, the U.S. instructions read: “Please rate your politi-
cal ideology on the following scale. In the United States, 
‘liberal’ is usually used to refer to left-wing and ‘conserva-
tive’ is usually used to refer to right-wing.”
Education. Participants reported their educational attain-
ment in response to a single item, “What is the highest 
educational level that you have attained?” The response 
scale was as follows: 1 = no formal education, 2 = com-
pleted primary/elementary school, 3 = completed secondary 
school/high school, 4 = some university/college, 5 = com-
pleted university/college degree, 6 = completed advanced 
degree.
Socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic status (SES) was 
measured with the ladder technique (Adler et al., 1994). 
Participants used a ladder with 10 steps to indicate their 
standing in the community with which they most identi-
fied relative to other people in that community. On the 
ladder, 1 indicated people having the lowest standing in 
the community, and 10 referred to people having the 
highest standing. Previous research demonstrated that 
this item has good convergent validity with objective cri-
teria of individual social status and also good construct 
validity with regard to several psychological and physio-
logical health indicators (e.g., Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & 
Ickovics, 2000; S. Cohen et al., 2008). This ladder was also 
used as one of the items for Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, 
and Keltner’s (2012, Study 3) effect in Slate 1. Participants 
in that slate answered the ladder item as part of the mate-
rials for that effect and did not receive the item a second 
time.
Data quality
Recent research on careless responding or insufficient 
effort in responding has suggested that there is a need 
to refine implementation of established scales embed-
ded in data collection to check for aberrant response 
patterns (Huang et al., 2014; Meade & Craig, 2012). As 
a check on data quality, we included two items at the 
end of the study, just prior to the demographic items. 
The first item asked participants, “In your honest opin-
ion, should we use your data in our analyses in this 
study?” and had “yes” and “no” as response options 
(Meade & Craig, 2012). The second item was an instruc-
tional manipulation check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & 
Davidenko, 2009), in which an ostensibly simple demo-
graphic question (“Where are you completing this 
study?”) was preceded by a long block of text that 
contained, in part, alternative instructions for partici-
pants to follow to demonstrate that they were paying 
attention (“Instead, simply check all four boxes and 
then press ‘continue’ to proceed to the next screen”).
Individual difference measures
The following individual difference measures were 
included to allow future tests of effect-size moderation.
Cognitive reflection. The cognitive-reflection task (CRT; 
Frederick, 2005) assesses individuals’ ability to suppress 
an intuitive (wrong) response in favor of a deliberative 
(correct) answer. The items on the original CRT are 
widely known, and the measure is vulnerable to practice 
effects (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). Therefore, 
we used an updated version that is logically equivalent 
and correlates highly with the items on the original CRT 
(Finucane & Gullion, 2010). The three items are (a) “If it 
takes 2 nurses 2 minutes to measure the blood pressure 
of 2 patients, how long would it take 200 nurses to mea-
sure the blood pressure of 200 patients?”; (b) “Soup and 
salad cost $5.50 in total. The soup costs a dollar more 
than the salad. How much does the salad cost?”; and (c) 
“Sally is making tea. Every hour, the concentration of the 
tea doubles. If it takes 6 hours for the tea to be ready, 
how long would it take for the tea to reach half of the 
final concentration?” Also, we constrained the total time 
available to answer the three questions to 75 s. This likely 
lowered overall performance on average, as it was some-
what less time than some participants took in pretesting.
Subjective well-being. Subjective well-being was mea-
sured with a single item: “All things considered, how sat-
isfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” The 
response scale ranged from 1, dissatisfied, to 10, satisfied. 
Similar items have been included in numerous large-scale 
social surveys (cf. Veenhoven, 2009) and have shown sat-
isfactory reliability (e.g., Lucas & Donnellan, 2012) and 
validity (Cheung & Lucas, 2014; Oswald & Wu, 2010; 
Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz, 1993).
Global self-esteem. Global self-esteem was measured 
using the Single-Item Self-Esteem Scale (Robins, Hendin, 
& Trzesniewski, 2001), which was designed as an alterna-
tive to the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. The SISE 
consists of a single item: “I have high self-esteem.” Partici-
pants respond on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, 
not very true of me, to 5, very true of me. Robins et al. 
reported that the SISE has strong convergent validity with 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale among adults (rs rang-
ing from .70 to .80) and that the SISE and Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale have similar predictive validity.
Big Five personality. The five basic traits of human per-
sonality (Goldberg, 1981)—conscientiousness, agreeable-
ness, neuroticism (emotional stability), openness (intellect), 
and extraversion—were measured with the Ten-Item Per-
sonality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). Each 
trait was assessed with two items answered on response 
scales from 1, disagree strongly, to 7, agree strongly. The five 
scales have satisfactory retest reliability (cf. Gnambs, 2014) 
and substantial convergent validity with longer Big Five 
instruments (e.g., Ehrhart et al., 2009; Gosling et al., 2003; 
Rojas & Widiger, 2014).
Mood. There exist many assessments of mood. We selected 
the single item from G. L. Cohen et al. (2007): “How would 
you describe your mood right now?” The response options 
are as follows: 1 = extremely bad, 2 = bad, 3 = neutral, 4 = 
good, 5 = extremely good.
Disgust sensitivity. To measure disgust sensitivity, we 
used the Contamination Disgust subscale of the Disgust 
Scale–Revised (DS-R; Olatunji et al., 2007), a 25-item revi-
sion of the original Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt, 
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994). The subscales of the DS-R 
were determined by factor analysis. The Contamination 
Disgust subscale includes 5 items related to concerns 
about bodily contamination. Because of length consider-
ations, this subscale was included only in Slate 1, for 
Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, and Bloom’s (2009, Study 1) effect. 
No part of the DS-R appeared in Slate 2.
The 28 Effects
Before presenting the main results for heterogeneity 
across samples and settings, we discuss each of the 28 
selected effects. For each effect, we summarize the main 
idea of the original research, provide the sample size, 
and present the inferential test and effect size that were 
the target for replication. Then, we summarize the 
aggregate result of the replication. For these aggregate 
tests, we pooled the data of all available samples, ignor-
ing sample origin. An aggregate result was labeled con-
sistent with the original finding if the effect was 
statistically significant and in the same direction as in 
the original study. The vast majority of the original stud-
ies were conducted in a Western, educated, industrial-
ized, rich, democratic (i.e., WEIRD) society (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). For the four original stud-
ies that focused on cultural differences, we present the 
replication results such that positive effect sizes cor-
respond to the direction of the effect that had been 
observed in the original WEIRD sample. Our main rep-
lication result is the aggregate effect size regardless of 
cultural context. Whether effects varied by setting (or 
cultural context more generally) was examined in the 
heterogeneity analyses reported in the Results section. 
Heterogeneity was assessed using the Q, tau, and I 2 
measures (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 
2009). If there was opportunity to test the original cul-
tural difference with similar samples, we did so, and 
these additional results are reported in this section. If 
the original authors anticipated moderating influences 
that could affect comparison of the original and replica-
tion effect sizes, then we also report those analyses.
Readers interested in the global results of this repli-
cation project may skip this long section detailing each 
individual replication and proceed to the section pre-
senting the systematic meta-analyses testing variation 
by sample and setting.
Slate 1
1. Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status (Huang
et al., 2014, Study 1a). People in the United States and 
Hong Kong have different demographic knowledge that 
may shape their metaphoric association between valence 
and cardinal direction (north vs. south). One hundred 
eighty participants from the United States and Hong Kong 
participated in Huang et al.’s (2014) Study 1a. They were 
presented with a blank map of a fictional city and were 
randomly assigned to indicate on the map where either a 
high-SES or a low-SES person might live. There was an 
interaction between SES (high vs. low) and population 
(United States vs. Hong Kong), F(1, 176) = 20.39, MSE = 
5.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, d = 0.68, 95% confidence inter-
val  (CI) = [0.38, 0.98]. U.S. participants expected the 
high-SES person to live further north (M = 0.98, SD = 
1.85) than the low-SES person (M = −0.69, SD = 2.19), 
t(78) = 3.69, p < .001, d = 0.83, 95% CI = [0.37, 1.28]. Con-
versely, Hong Kong participants expected the low-SES 
person to live further north (M = 0.63, SD = 2.75) than 
the  high-SES person (M = −0.92, SD = 2.47), t(98) = 
−2.95, p = .004, d = −0.59, 95% CI = [−0.99, −0.19]. The 
authors explained that wealth in Hong Kong is concen-
trated in the south of the city, and wealth in cities in the 
United States is more commonly concentrated in the 
north of the city. As a consequence, members of these 
cultures differ in their assumptions about the concentra-
tion of wealth in fictional cities.
Replication. The coordinates of participants’ clicks on 
the fictional map were recorded (x, y) from the top left 
of the image and then recentered in the analysis such 
that clicks in the north half of the map were positive 
and clicks in the southern half of the map were negative. 
Across all samples (N = 6,591), participants in the high-
SES condition (M = 11.70, SD = 84.31) selected a further 
north location than did participants in the low-SES con-
dition (M = −22.70, SD = 88.78), t(6554.05) = 16.12, p = 
2.15e−57, d = 0.40, 95% CI = [0.35, 0.45].
As suggested by the original authors, the focal test 
for replicating the effect they found for Western par-
ticipants was completed by selecting only those par-
ticipants, across all samples, who indicated that wealth 
tended to be in the north in their hometown. These 
participants expected the high-SES person to live fur-
ther north (M = 43.22, SD = 84.43) than the low-SES 
person (M = −40.63, SD = 84.99), t(1692) = 20.36, p = 
1.24e−82, d = 0.99, 95% CI = [0.89, 1.09]. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that people reporting 
that wealthier people tend to live in the north in their 
hometown also guess that wealthier people will tend 
to live in the north in a fictional city, and the effect was 
substantially larger than that in the sample as a whole.
Follow-up analyses. The original study compared Hong 
Kong and U.S. participants. In the replication, Hong Kong 
participants expected the high-SES person to live further 
south (M = −37.44, SD = 84.29) than the low-SES person 
(M = 12.43, SD = 95.03), t(140) = −3.30, p = .001, d = 
−0.55, 95% CI = [−0.89, −0.22]. U.S. participants expected 
the high-SES person to live further north (M = 41.55, SD = 
80.73) than the low-SES person (M = −42.63, SD = 82.41), 
t(2199) = 24.20, p = 6.53e−115, d = 1.03, 95% CI = [0.94, 
1.12]. This result is consistent with the original finding 
that cultural differences in perceived location of wealth 
in a fictional city correlated with location of wealth in 
participants’ hometown.
Most participants completed the items for this study 
on a vertically oriented monitor display as opposed to 
a paper survey on a desk, as in the original study. The 
original authors suggested a priori that this difference 
might be important because associations between “up” 
and “good” or between “down” and “bad” might inter-
fere with any associations with “north” and “south.” At 
10 data-collection sites (n = 582), we assigned some 
participants to complete Slate 1 on Microsoft Surface 
tablets resting horizontally on a table. Among the par-
ticipants using the horizontal tablets, those who said 
that wealth tended to be in the north in their hometown 
(n = 156) expected the high-SES person to live further 
north (M = 38.66, SD = 80.43) than the low-SES person 
(M = −43.92, SD = 80.32), t(154) = 6.38, p = 1.95e−09, 
d = 1.03, 95% CI = [0.69, 1.36]. By comparison, within 
this horizontal-tablet group, participants who said that 
wealth tended to be in the south in their hometown 
(n = 87) expected the high-SES person to live further 
south (M = −33.58, SD = 72.89) than the low-SES person 
(M = −4.11, SD = 88.33), t(85) = −1.63, p = .11, d = −0.36, 
95% CI = [−0.79, 0.08]. The effect sizes for just these 
subsamples were very similar to the effect sizes for the 
whole sample, which suggests that the orientation of 
the display did not moderate this effect.
2. Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin,
Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014, Study 2). In Study 2 of 
Kay et al. (2014), 67 participants generated what they felt 
was their most important goal. They then read one of two 
scenarios in which a natural event (leaves growing on 
trees) was described as being a structured or random 
event. For example, in the structured condition, a sen-
tence read, “The way trees produce leaves is one of the 
many examples of the orderly patterns created by nature 
. . . ,” but in the random condition, the corresponding 
sentence read, “The way trees produce leaves is one of 
the many examples of the natural randomness that sur-
rounds us. . . .” Next, participants answered three ques-
tions about their most important goal, on a scale from 1, 
not very, to 7, extremely. The first item measured the sub-
jective value of the goal, and the other two items mea-
sured willingness to pursue that goal. Participants 
exposed to a structured event (M = 5.26, SD = 0.88) were 
more willing to pursue their goal compared with those 
exposed to a random event (M = 4.72, SD = 1.32), t(65) = 
2.00, p = .05, d = 0.49, 95% CI = [0.001, 0.973]. In the 
overall replication sample (N = 6,506), participants 
exposed to a structured event (M = 5.48, SD = 1.45) were 
not significantly more willing to pursue their goal com-
pared with those exposed to a random event (M = 5.51, 
SD = 1.39), t(6498.63) = −0.94, p = .35, d = −0.02, 95% 
CI = [−0.07, 0.03]. This result does not support the hypoth-
esis that willingness to pursue goals is higher after expo-
sure to structured as opposed to random events.
3. Disfluency engages analytic processing (Alter,
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007, Study 4). In Study 
4, Alter et  al. (2007) investigated whether a deliberate, 
analytic processing style can be activated by incidental 
disfluency cues that suggest task difficulty. Forty-one par-
ticipants attempted to solve syllogisms presented in either 
a hard-to-read or an easy-to-read font. The hard-to-read 
font served as an incidental induction of disfluency. Par-
ticipants in the hard-to-read-font condition answered 
more moderately difficult syllogisms correctly (64%) than 
did participants in the easy-to-read-font condition (42%), 
t(39) = 2.01, p = .051, d = 0.63, 95% CI = [−0.004, 1.25].
Replication. The original study focused on the two 
moderately difficult syllogisms among the six adminis-
tered. Our analysis strategy was sensitive to potential dif-
ferences across samples in ability to solve the syllogisms. 
We first determined which ones were moderately diffi-
cult for participants by excluding within each sample any 
syllogisms that were answered correctly by fewer than 
25% of participants or more than 75% of participants in 
the two conditions combined. The remaining syllogisms 
were used to calculate mean syllogism performance for 
each participant.
As in Alter et  al.’s (2007) experiment, the easy-to-
read font was 12-point black Myriad Web font, and the 
hard-to-read font was 10-point 10% gray italicized 
Myriad Web font. For a direct comparison with the 
original effect size, the original authors suggested that 
only English in-lab samples be used for two reasons: 
First, we could not adequately control for online par-
ticipants “zooming in” on the page or otherwise making 
the font more readable, and second, we anticipated 
having to substitute the font in some translated versions 
because the original font (Myriad Web) might not sup-
port all languages.2 In this subsample (N = 2,580), the 
number of syllogisms answered correctly by partici-
pants in the hard-to-read-font condition (M = 1.10, 
SD = 0.88) was similar to the number answered cor-
rectly by participants in the easy-to-read-font condition 
(M = 1.13, SD = 0.91), t(2578) = −0.79, p = .43, d = −0.03, 
95% CI = [−0.08, 0.01]. In a secondary analysis that mir-
rored the original, we used performance on the same 
two syllogisms Alter et  al. (2007) focused on. Again, 
the number of syllogisms answered correctly by partici-
pants in the hard-to-read-font condition (M = 0.80, 
SD = 0.79) was similar to the number answered correctly 
by participants in the easy-to-read-font condition (M = 
0.84, SD = 0.81), t(2578) = −1.19, p = .23, d = −0.05, 
95% CI = [−0.12, 0.03]).3 These results do not support 
the hypothesis that syllogism performance is higher 
when the font is harder to read; the difference between 
conditions was slightly in the opposite direction and 
not distinguishable from zero (d = −0.03, 95% CI = 
[−0.08, 0.01], vs. original d = 0.64).
Follow-up analyses. In the aggregate replication sam-
ple (N = 6,935), the number of syllogisms answered cor-
rectly was similar in the hard-to-read-font condition (M = 
1.03, SD = 0.86) and the easy-to-read-font condition (M = 
1.06, SD = 0.87), t(6933) = −1.37, p = .17, d = −0.03, 95% 
CI = [−0.08, 0.01]. Finally, in the whole sample, an analy-
sis using the same two syllogisms that Alter et al. (2007) 
did showed that participants in the hard-to-read-font 
condition answered about as many syllogisms correctly 
(M = 0.75, SD = 0.76) as participants in the easy-to-read-
font condition (M = 0.79, SD = 0.77), t(6933) = −2.07, p = 
.039, d = −0.05, 95% CI = [−0.097, −0.003]. These follow-
up analyses do not qualify the conclusion from the focal 
tests.
4. Moral foundations of liberals versus conserva-
tives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009, Study 1). People 
on the political left (liberal) and political right (conservative) 
have distinct policy preferences and may also have different 
moral intuitions and principles. In Graham et  al.’s (2009) 
Study 1, 1,548 participants across the ideological spec-
trum rated whether different concepts, such as “purity” 
and “fairness,” were relevant for deciding whether some-
thing was right or wrong. Items that emphasized concerns 
of harm or fairness (individualizing foundations) were 
deemed more relevant for moral judgment by the political 
left than by the political right (r = −.21, d = −0.43, 95% 
CI = [−0.55, −0.32]), whereas items that emphasized con-
cerns for the in-group, authority, or purity (binding foun-
dations) were deemed more relevant for moral judgment 
by the political right than by the political left (r = .25, d = 
0.52, 95% CI = [0.40, 0.63]).4 Participants rated the rele-
vance to moral judgment of 15 items (3 for each founda-
tion) in a randomized order on a 6-point scale from not at 
all relevant to extremely relevant.
Replication. The primary target of replication was the 
relationship between political ideology and the binding 
foundations. In the aggregate sample (N = 6,966), items 
that emphasized concerns for the in-group, authority, or 
purity were deemed more relevant for moral judgment 
by the political right than by the political left (r = .14, 
p = 6.05e−34, d = 0.29, 95% CI = [0.25, 0.34], q = 0.15, 
95% CI = [0.12, 0.17]). This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that binding foundations are perceived as more 
morally relevant by members of the political right than by 
members of the political left. The overall effect size was 
smaller than the original (d = 0.29, 95% CI = [0.25, 0.34], 
vs. original d = 0.52).
Follow-up analyses. The relationship between politi-
cal ideology and the individualizing foundations was a 
secondary replication target. In the aggregate sample 
(N = 6,970), items that emphasized concerns of harm or 
fairness were deemed more relevant for moral judgment 
by the political left than by the political right (r = −.13, 
p = 2.54e−29, d = −0.27, 95% CI = [−0.32, −0.22], q = −0.13, 
95% CI = [−0.16, −0.11]). This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that individualizing foundations are perceived 
as more morally relevant by members of the political left 
than by members of the political right. The overall effect 
size was smaller than the original result (d = −0.27, 95% 
CI = [−0.32, −0.22], vs. original d = −0.43).
5. Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001, Study
1). In this experiment, 40 participants chose whether 
they would prefer an affectively attractive option (a kiss 
from a favorite movie star) or a financially attractive 
option ($50). In one condition, participants made the 
choice imagining a low probability (1%) of getting the 
outcome. In the other condition, participants imagined 
that the outcome was certain, and they just needed to 
choose between the options. When the outcome was 
unlikely, 70% of participants preferred the affectively 
attractive option; when the outcome was certain, 35% 
preferred the affectively attractive option. The difference 
between conditions was significant, χ2(1, N = 40) = 4.91, 
p = .0267, d = 0.74, 95% CI = [< 0.001, 1.74]. This result 
supported the hypothesis that positive affect has greater 
influence on judgments about uncertain outcomes than 
on judgments about definite outcomes.
In the aggregate replication sample (N = 7,218), 
when the outcome was unlikely, 47% of participants 
preferred the affectively attractive choice, and when 
the outcome was certain, 51% preferred the affectively 
attractive choice. The difference was significant, p = 
.002, odds ratio (OR) = 0.87, d = −0.08, 95% CI = [−0.13, 
−0.03], but in the direction opposite the prediction of 
the hypothesis (i.e., that affectively attractive choices 
are more preferred when they are uncertain rather than 
definite). The overall effect was much smaller than in 
the original study and in the opposite direction (d = 
−0.08, 95% CI = [−0.13, −0.03], vs. original d = 0.74).
6. Consumerism undermines trust (Bauer, Wilkie,
Kim, & Bodenhausen, 2012, Study 4). Bauer et  al. 
(2012) examined whether being in a consumer mind-set 
would reduce trust in other people. In their Study 4, 77 
participants read about a hypothetical water-conservation 
dilemma in which they were involved. They were randomly 
assigned to either a condition that referred to them and 
other people in the scenario as “consumers” or a condi-
tion that referred to them and other people in the sce-
nario as “individuals” (control condition). Participants in 
the consumer condition reported less trust that other peo-
ple would conserve water (M = 4.08, SD = 1.56; scale from 
1, not at all, to 7, very much) compared with participants 
in the control condition (M = 5.33, SD = 1.30), t(76) = 3.86, 
p = .001, d = 0.87, 95% CI = [0.41, 1.34].
Replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
6,608), participants in the consumer condition reported 
slightly less trust that other people would conserve water 
(M = 3.92, SD = 1.44) compared with participants in the 
control condition (M = 4.10, SD = 1.45), t(6606) = 4.93, 
p = 8.62e−7, d = 0.12, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.17]. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that people have lower 
trust in others when they think of those others as con-
sumers rather than as individuals. The overall effect size 
was much smaller than in the original experiment (d = 
0.12, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.17], vs. original d = 0.87).
Follow-up analyses. The original experiment and the 
replication examined the effect of the priming manipula-
tion on four additional dependent variables. Compared 
with the original study, the replication showed weaker 
effects in the same direction for (a) participants’ feelings 
of responsibility for the crisis (original d = 0.47; repli-
cation d = 0.10, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.15]), (b) participants’ 
feelings of obligation to cut water usage (original d = 
0.29; replication d = 0.08, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.13]), (c) par-
ticipants’ perception of other people as partners (original 
d = 0.53; replication d = 0.12, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.16]), and 
(d) participants’ judgments about how much less water 
other people should use (original d = 0.25; replication 
d = 0.01, 95% CI = [−0.04, 0.06]).
7. Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama,
2002, Study 1). Miyamoto and Kitayama (2002) exam-
ined whether Americans would be more likely than Japa-
nese to show a bias toward ascribing to an actor an 
attitude corresponding to the actor’s behavior, a phenom-
enon referred to as correspondence bias ( Jones & Harris, 
1967). In their Study 1, 49 Japanese and 58 American 
undergraduates learned that they would read a university 
student’s essay about the death penalty and infer the stu-
dent’s true attitude toward the issue. The essay was either 
in favor of or against the death penalty, and it was 
designed to be diagnostic or not very diagnostic of a 
strong attitude. After reading the essay, participants 
learned that the student had been assigned which posi-
tion to argue. Then, participants estimated the essay writ-
er’s actual attitude toward capital punishment and the 
extent to which they thought the student’s behavior was 
constrained by the assignment.
Controlling for perceived constraint, analyses com-
pared perceived attitudes of the writer who wrote in 
favor of capital punishment and the writer who wrote 
against it (rating scale from 1, against capital punish-
ment, to 15, supports capital punishment). American 
participants perceived a large difference between the 
actual attitude of the essay writer who had been 
assigned to write a pro-capital-punishment essay (M = 
10.82, SD = 3.47) and the writer who had been assigned 
to write an anti-capital-punishment essay (M = 3.30, 
SD = 2.62), t(27) = 6.66, p < .001, d = 2.47, 95% CI = 
[1.46, 3.49]. Japanese participants perceived less of a 
difference in actual attitudes (M = 9.27, SD = 2.88, and 
M = 7.02, SD = 3.06, respectively), t(23) = 1.84, p = .069, 
d = 0.74, 95% CI = [–0.12, 1.59].
Replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
7,197), controlling for perceived constraint, participants per-
ceived a difference in actual attitudes between the essay writer 
who had been assigned to write a pro-capital-punishment 
essay (M = 10.98, SD = 3.69) and the essay writer who had 
been assigned to write an anti-capital-punishment essay 
(M = 4.45, SD = 3.51), F(2, 7194) = 3,042.00, p < 2.2e−16, 
d = 1.82, 95% CI = [1.76, 1.87]. This finding is consistent 
with the correspondence-bias hypothesis: Participants 
inferred the essay writer’s attitude, in part, on the basis of 
the writer’s observed behavior. Whether the magnitude of 
this effect varies cross-culturally was examined in tests dis-
cussed in the Results section.
Follow-up analyses. Results for the primary replication 
analysis showed that participants estimated the writer’s 
true attitude toward capital punishment to be similar to 
the position that the writer was assigned to defend. Par-
ticipants also expected that the writers would express 
attitudes consistent with the position to which they were 
assigned if given the opportunity to talk freely about 
capital punishment (pro–capital punishment: M = 10.17, 
SD = 3.84; anti–capital punishment: M = 4.96, SD = 3.61), 
t(7187) = 59.44, p = 2.2e−16, d = 1.40, 95% CI = [1.35, 1.45].
Two possible moderators were included in the 
design: perceived attitude of the average student in the 
writer’s country (tailored to be the same as the partici-
pant’s country) and perceived persuasiveness of the 
essay. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 7,211), 
controlling for perceived constraint, we did not observe 
an interaction between condition and perceived attitude 
of the average student in the writer’s country on estima-
tions of the writer’s true attitude toward capital punish-
ment, t(7178) = 0.55, p = .58, d = 0.013, 95% CI = [−0.03, 
0.06]. We did, however, observe an interaction between 
condition and perceived persuasiveness of the essay 
on estimations of the writer’s true attitude toward capi-
tal punishment, t(7170) = 16.25, p = 2.3e−58, d = 0.38, 
95% CI = [0.34, 0.43]. The effect of condition on estima-
tions of the writer’s true attitude toward capital punish-
ment was stronger for higher levels of perceived 
persuasiveness of the essay.
8. Disgust sensitivity predicts homophobia (Inbar
et al., 2009, Study 1). Behaviors that are deemed mor-
ally wrong may be judged as more intentional than 
behaviors without moral implications (Knobe, 2006). 
Thus, people who judge the portrayal of gay sexual activ-
ity in the media as intentional may view homosexuality 
as morally reprehensible. In Inbar et al.’s (2009) Study 1, 
44 participants read a vignette about a director’s action 
and judged him as more intentional (scale from 1, not at 
all, to 7, definitely) when he was described as encourag-
ing gay kissing (M = 4.36, SD = 1.51) than when he was 
describing more generally as encouraging kissing (M = 
2.91, SD = 2.01), β = 0.41, t(39) = 3.39, p = .002, r = .48. 
Disgust sensitivity was positively related to judgments of 
intentionality in the gay-kissing condition, β = 0.79, t(19) = 
4.49, p = .0003, r = .72, and not the kissing condition, β = 
−0.20, t(19) = −0.88, p = .38, r = .20. The correlation was 
stronger in the gay-kissing condition than in the kissing 
condition, z = 2.11, p = .03, q = 0.70, 95% CI = [0.05, 1.36]. 
The authors concluded that individuals who are more 
prone to disgust are more likely to interpret encourage-
ment of gay kissing as intentional, which indicates that 
they intuitively disapprove of homosexuality.
Replication. The relationship between disgust sensitiv-
ity and intentionality ratings was the target of our direct 
replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
7,117), participants did not judge the director’s action as 
more intentional when he encouraged gay kissing (M = 
3.48, SD = 1.87) than when he encouraged kissing (M = 
3.51, SD = 1.84), t(7115) = −0.74, p = .457, d = −0.02, 95% 
CI = [−0.06, 0.03]. Greater disgust sensitivity was related 
to judgments of greater intentionality in both the gay-
kissing condition, r = .12, p = 1.2e−13, and the kissing 
condition, r = .07, p = 2.48e−5. The correlation in the 
gay-kissing condition was similar to the correlation in the 
kissing condition, z = 2.62, p = .02, q = 0.05, 95% CI = 
[0.01, 0.10]. These data are inconsistent with the original 
finding that disgust sensitivity and perceived intentional-
ity are more strongly related when people consider gay 
kissing than when they consider kissing in general, and 
the effect size was much smaller than the original effect 
size (q = 0.05, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.10], vs. original q = 0.70). 
Disgust sensitivity was very weakly related to perceived 
intentionality, and there was no mean difference in per-
ceived intentionality between the gay-kissing and kissing 
conditions.
Follow-up analyses. The original study included two 
other outcome measures based on responses to yes/no 
questions. These were examined as secondary replica-
tions following the same analysis strategy as for inten-
tionality. First, disgust sensitivity was only slightly more 
related to responses to “Is there anything wrong with 
homosexual men French kissing in public?” (r = −.20, 
p < 2.2e−16) than to responses to “Is there anything wrong 
with couples French kissing in public?” (r = −.16, p < 
2.2e−16; z = −1.66, p = .096, q = −0.04, 95% CI = [−0.09, 
0.01]). Second, disgust sensitivity was only slightly more 
related to answers to “Was it wrong of the director to 
make a video that he knew would encourage homosex-
ual men to French kiss in public?” (r = .27, p < 2.2e−16) 
than to “Was it wrong of the director to make a video 
that he knew would encourage couples to French kiss in 
public?” (r = .22, p < 2.2e−16; z = 2.28, p = .02, q = 0.05, 
95% CI = [0.01, 0.10]).
9. Influence of incidental anchors on judgment
(Critcher & Gilovich, 2008, Study 2). In Critcher and 
Gilovich’s (2008) Study 2, 207 participants predicted the 
relative popularity of a new cell phone in the U.S. and 
European marketplaces. In one condition, the smart-
phone was called the P97; in the other condition, the 
smartphone was called the P17. Participants in the P97 
condition estimated that a greater percentage of the new 
phone’s sales would be in the United States (M = 58.1%, 
SD = 19.6%) compared with participants in the P17 con-
dition (M = 51.9%, SD = 21.7%), t(197.5) = 2.12, p = .03, 
d = 0.30, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.58]. This result supported the 
hypothesis that judgment can be influenced by incidental 
anchors in the environment. The mere presence of a high 
or low number in the name of the cell phone influenced 
estimates of sales of the phone.
Replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
6,826), participants’ estimates of the percentage of sales 
the new phone would garner in their region as opposed 
to a foreign market were approximately the same in the 
P97 condition (M = 49.87%, SD = 21.86%) as in the P17 
condition (M = 48.98%, SD = 22.14%), t(6824) = 1.68, p = 
.09, d = 0.04, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.09]. This result does not 
support the hypothesis that sales estimates are influenced 
by incidental anchors. The effect size was in the same 
direction as the original effect size, but much smaller 
(d = 0.04, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.09], vs. original d = 0.30) and 
indistinguishable from zero.
Follow-up analyses. The original authors administered 
this experiment with paper and pencil, rather than on a 
computer, to avoid the possibility that the numeric keys 
on the keyboard might serve as primes. We administered 
this task with paper and pencil at 11 sites. At these sites 
(N = 1,112), participants in the P97 condition estimated 
that the new phone’s percentage of sales in their region 
would be slightly smaller (M = 53.02%, SD = 20.15%) 
compared with participants in the P17 condition (M = 
53.28%, SD = 20.17%), t(1110) = −0.22, p = .83, d = −0.01, 
95% CI = [−0.13, 0.10]. This difference was in the direc-
tion opposite the direction of the original finding, but not 
reliably different from zero.
10. Social value orientation and family size (Van
Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997, Study 3). Van 
Lange et  al. (1997) proposed that social value orienta-
tions (SVOs) are rooted in social interaction experiences, 
and that the number of one’s siblings is one variable that 
influences such experiences. In one of four studies (Study 
3), they examined the association between SVO and fam-
ily size, thereby providing a test of two competing 
hypotheses. One hypothesis states that in larger families, 
resources have to be shared more frequently, and this 
facilitates cooperation and the development of a proso-
cial orientation. Another hypothesis, rooted in group-size 
effects, states that greater family size may undermine 
trust and expected cooperation from other people, and 
may therefore inhibit the development of prosocial orien-
tation. In Study 3, 631 participants reported how many 
siblings they had and completed an SVO measure called 
the Triple-Dominance Measure, which identified them as 
prosocial people, individualists, or competitors. An anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant differ-
ence in SVO across these groups, F(2, 535) = 4.82, p = .01. 
Prosocial people had more siblings (M = 2.03, SD = 1.56) 
than individualists (M = 1.63, SD = 1.00) and competitors 
(M = 1.71, SD = 1.35), ds = 0.287, 95% CI = [0.095, 0.478], 
and 0.210, 95% CI = [−0.045, 0.465], respectively. Planned 
comparisons of the number of siblings revealed a signifi-
cant contrast between prosocial people, on the one hand, 
and individualists and competitors, on the other, F(1, 
535) = 9.14, p = .003, d = 0.19, 95% CI = [< 0.01, 0.47].
The original demonstration used a measure of SVO 
with three categorical values. In discussion with the 
original first author, an alternative measure, the SVO 
slider (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011), was 
identified as a useful replacement to yield a continuous 
distribution of scores. Thus, the replication focused 
only on the observed direct positive correlation between 
prosocial orientation and number of siblings. In the 
aggregate replication sample (N = 6,234), number of 
siblings was not related to prosocial orientation (r = 
−.02, 95% CI = [−0.04, 0.01], p = .18). This result does 
not support the hypothesis that having more siblings 
is positively related with prosocial orientation. Direct 
comparison of effect sizes was not possible because of 
the change in the SVO measure, but the replication 
effect size was near zero.
11. Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect
(Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007, 
Scenarios 1 and 2). According to the principle of dou-
ble effect, an act that harms other people is more morally 
permissible if the act is a foreseen side effect rather than 
the means to the greater good. Hauser et al. (2007) com-
pared participants’ reactions to two scenarios to test 
whether their judgments followed this principle. In the 
foreseen-side-effect scenario, a person on an out-of-control 
train changed the train’s trajectory so that the train killed 
one person instead of five. In the greater-good scenario, a 
person pushed a fat man in front of a train, killing him, to 
save five people. Whereas 89% of participants judged the 
action in the foreseen-side-effect scenario as permissible 
(95% CI = [87%, 91%]), only 11% of participants in the 
greater-good scenario judged it as permissible (95% CI = 
[9%, 13%]). The difference between the percentages was 
significant, χ2(1, N = 2,646) = 1,615.96, p < .001, w = .78, 
d = 2.50, 95% CI = [2.22, 2.86]. Thus, the results provided 
evidence for the principle of double effect.
Replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
6,842 after removing participants who responded in less 
than 4 s), 71% of participants judged the action in the 
foreseen-side-effect scenario as permissible, but only 17% 
of participants in the greater-good scenario judged it as 
permissible. The difference between the percentages was 
significant, p = 2.2e−16, OR = 11.54, d = 1.35, 95% CI = 
[1.28, 1.41]. The replication results were consistent with 
the double-effect hypothesis, and the effect was about 
half the magnitude of the original (d = 1.35, 95% CI = 
[1.28, 1.41], vs. original d = 2.50).
Follow-up analyses. Variations of the trolley problem 
are well known. The original authors suggested that the 
effect may be weaker for participants who have previ-
ously been exposed to this sort of task. We included an 
additional item assessing participants’ prior knowledge of 
the task. Among the 3,069 participants reporting that they 
were not familiar with the task, Cohen’s d was 1.47, 95% 
CI = [1.38, 1.57]; among the 4,107 who reported being 
familiar with the task, Cohen’s d was 1.20, 95% CI = [1.12, 
1.28]. This suggests moderation by task familiarity, but the 
effect was very strong regardless of familiarity.
12. Sociometric status and well-being (Anderson
et al., 2012, Study 3). Anderson et al. (2012) examined 
the relationships among sociometric status (SMS), SES, 
and subjective well-being. According to the authors, SMS 
refers to interpersonal wealth, whereas SES refers to fiscal 
wealth. Study 3 examined whether SMS has stronger ties 
than SES to well-being. In a 2 × 2 between-participants 
design, 228 Mechanical Turk participants were presented 
with descriptions of people who were either relatively 
high or relatively low on either SES or SMS and then 
made upward or downward social comparisons (e.g., 
participants in the high-SMS condition imagined and 
compared themselves with a low-SMS person). Then, 
participants wrote about what it would be like to interact 
with such people, and then reported their subjective 
well-being. Results showed a significant 2 × 2 interaction, 
F(1, 224) = 4.73, p = .03. Participants in the high-SMS 
condition had higher subjective well-being than those in 
the low-SMS condition, t(115) = 3.05, p = .003, d = 0.57, 
95% CI = [0.20, 0.93], but there were no differences 
between the two SES conditions, t(109) = 0.06, p = .96, 
d = 0.01.
For replication, we used only the high- and low-SMS 
conditions and excluded the high- and low-SES condi-
tions because they showed no differences in the origi-
nal study. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
6,905), participants in the high-SMS condition (M = 
−0.01, SD = 0.67) had slightly lower subjective well-
being than those in the low-SMS condition (M = 0.01, 
SD = 0.66; scores were standardized and averaged), 
t(6903) = −1.76, p = .08, d = −0.04, 95% CI = [−0.09, 
0.004]. This result did not support the hypothesis that 
subjective well-being is higher for participants exposed 
to descriptions of higher SMS. The effect was small in 
magnitude, much smaller than the original effect, and 
in the opposite direction (d = −0.04, 95% CI = [−0.09, 
0.004], vs. original d = 0.57).
13. False consensus: supermarket scenario (Ross,
Greene, & House, 1977, Study 1). People perceive a 
false consensus regarding how common their own 
responses are among other people (Ross et  al., 1977). 
Thus, estimates of the prevalence of a particular belief, 
opinion, or behavior are biased in the direction of the 
perceiver’s belief, opinion, or behavior. In Study 1, Ross 
et al. presented 320 college undergraduates with one of 
four hypothetical events that culminated in a clear dichot-
omous choice of action. Participants first estimated what 
percentage of their peers would choose each option and 
then indicated their own choice. For each of the four 
scenarios, participants who chose the first option, com-
pared with those who chose the second, believed that a 
higher percentage of other people would choose the first 
option (M = 65.7% vs. 48.5%), F(1, 312) = 49.1, p < .001, 
d = 0.79, 95% CI = [0.56, 1.02]. A later meta-analysis sug-
gested that this effect is robust and moderate in size 
across a variety of paradigms (r = .31, Mullen et al., 1985).
This study was replicated in Slate 1 and Slate 2 using 
different scenarios. In Slate 1, participants were pre-
sented with the supermarket vignette, which had shown 
a significant effect in the original study, F(1, 78) = 17.7, 
d = 0.99, 95% CI = [0.24, 2.29]. All participants who 
provided percentage estimates between 0 and 100 and 
responded to all three items were included in the analy-
sis. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 7,205), 
participants who chose the first option, compared with 
those who chose the second, believed that a higher 
percentage of other people would choose the first 
option (M = 69.19% vs. 43.35%), t(6420.77) = 49.93, 
p < 2.2e−16, d = 1.18, 95% CI = [1.13, 1.23]. This result 
is consistent with the hypothesis that participants’ 
choices are positively correlated with their perception 
of the percentage of other people who would make the 
same choice.
Slate 2
14. False consensus: traffic-ticket scenario (Ross et al.,
1977, Study 1). In Slate 2, participants were presented 
with the traffic-ticket vignette, which had shown a signifi-
cant effect in Ross et al.’s (1977) Study 1 (see the previ-
ous paragraph for a description of that study), F(1, 78) = 
12.8, d = 0.80, 95% CI = [0.22, 1.87]. All participants who 
provided percentage estimates between 0 and 100 and 
who responded to all three items were included in the 
replication analysis. In the aggregate replication sample 
(N = 7,827), participants who chose the first option, com-
pared with those who chose the second, believed that a 
higher percentage of other people would choose the first 
option (M = 72.48% vs. 48.76%), t(6728.25) = 41.74, p < 
2.2e−16, d = 0.95, 95% CI = [0.90, 1.00]. This result is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that participants’ choices are 
positively correlated with their perception of the percent-
age of other people who would make the same choice.
15. Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert,
2007, Study 1a). In Giessner and Shubert’s (2007) Study 
1a, 64 participants formed an impression of a manager 
on the basis of a few pieces of information, including an 
organization chart with a vertical line connecting the 
manager on top with his team below. Participants had 
been randomly assigned to one of two conditions in 
which the line was either short (2 cm) or long (7 cm). 
After being presented with the information, participants 
indicated their agreement with statements that the man-
ager was dominant, had a strong leader personality, was 
self-confident, had considerable control in the company, 
and had high status in the company (scale from 1, totally 
disagree, to 7, totally agree). Responses were averaged to 
create a rating of the manager’s power. Participants in the 
long-line condition (M = 5.01, SD = 0.60) perceived the 
manager to have greater power than did participants in 
the short-line condition (M = 4.62, SD = 0.81), t(62) = 
2.20, p = .03, d = 0.55, 95% CI = [0.05, 1.05]. This result 
was interpreted as showing that people associate higher 
vertical position with greater power.
In the aggregate replication sample (N = 7,890), par-
ticipants in the long-line condition (M = 4.97, SD = 1.09) 
and participants in the short-line condition (M = 4.93, 
SD = 1.07) perceived the manager to have similar levels 
of power, t(7888) = 1.40, p = .16, d = 0.03, 95% CI = 
[−0.01, 0.08]. This result does not support the hypoth-
esis that perceived power is higher with greater vertical 
distance. The replication effect was in the same direc-
tion as, but much smaller than, the original (d = 0.03, 
95% CI = [−0.01, 0.08], vs. original d = 0.55).
16. Effect of framing on decision making (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981, Study 10). In Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1981) Study 10, 181 participants considered a scenario in 
which they were buying two items, one relatively cheap 
($15) and one relatively costly ($125). Ninety-three par-
ticipants were assigned to a condition in which the cheap 
item could be purchased for $5 less by going to a different 
branch of the store 20 min away. Eighty-eight participants 
were instead assigned to a condition in which the costly 
item could be purchased for $5 less at the other branch. 
Therefore, the total cost for the two items and the cost 
savings for traveling to the other branch were the same in 
the two conditions. Participants were more likely to say 
that they would go to the other branch when the cheap 
item was on sale (68%) than when the costly item was on 
sale (29%; z = 5.14, p = 7.4e−7, OR = 4.96, 95% CI = [2.55, 
9.90]). This suggests that the decision of whether to travel 
was influenced by the base cost of the discounted item 
rather than the total cost.
For the replication, in consultation with one of the 
original authors, we adjusted dollar amounts to be more 
appropriate for 2014 (i.e., when the replication study 
was conducted). The stimuli were also replaced with 
consumer items that were relevant in 2014 and plausibly 
sold by a single salesperson (a ceramic vase and a wall 
hanging). In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
7,228), participants were more likely to say that they 
would go to the other branch when the cheap item was 
on sale (49%) than when the costly item was on sale 
(32%; p = 1.01e−50, d = 0.40, 95% CI = [0.35, 0.45]; OR = 
2.06, 95% CI = [1.87, 2.27]). These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the base cost of a discounted 
item influences willingness to travel, though the effect 
was less than half the size of the original (OR = 2.06, 
95% CI = [1.87, 2.27], vs. original OR = 4.96).
17. Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double effect
(Hauser et al., 2007, Study 1, Scenarios 3 and 4). In 
Slate 2, participants were presented with the Ned and 
Oscar scenarios from Hauser et al.’s (2007) Study 1 (for a 
description of the original study, see Effect 11 in Slate 1). 
In the original study, 72% of the participants judged the 
action in the foreseen-side-effect (Oscar) scenario as per-
missible (95% CI = [69%, 74%]), and 56% of the participants 
judged the action in the greater-good (Ned) scenario as 
permissible (95% CI = [53%, 59%]). The difference between 
the percentages was significant, χ2(1, N = 2,612) = 72.35, 
p < .001, w = .17, d = 0.34, 95% CI = [0.26, 0.42].
Replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
7,923), after participants who responded in less than 4 
s were removed, 64% of participants judged the action 
in the foreseen-side-effect scenario as permissible, and 
53% of participants in the greater-good scenario judged 
it as permissible. The difference between the percent-
ages was significant (p = 4.66e−23, OR = 1.58, d = 0.25, 
95% CI = [0.20, 0.30]). These results are consistent with 
the principle of double effect, though the effect size was 
somewhat smaller in the replication compared with the 
original study (d = 0.25, 95% CI = [0.20, 0.30], vs. original 
d = 0.34).
Follow-up analyses. Again, we included an additional 
item assessing participants’ prior knowledge of the task. 
Among the 3,558 participants reporting that they were not 
familiar with the task, Cohen’s d was 0.27, 95% CI = [0.20, 
0.34]; among the 4,297 who were familiar with the task, 
Cohen’s d was 0.24, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.30]. In this case, 
familiarity did not moderate the observed effect size.
18. Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008,
Study 2). Risen and Gilovich (2008) explored the belief 
that tempting fate increases bad outcomes. They tested 
whether people judge the likelihood of a negative out-
come to be higher when they have imagined themselves 
or a classmate tempting fate, compared with when they 
have imagined themselves or a classmate not tempting 
fate. One hundred twenty participants read a scenario in 
which either they or a classmate (“Jon”) tempted fate (by 
not reading before class) or did not tempt fate (by com-
ing to class prepared). Participants then estimated how 
likely it was that the protagonist (themselves or Jon) 
would be called on by the professor (scale from 1, not at 
all likely, to 10, extremely likely). The predicted main 
effect emerged, as participants judged the likelihood 
of being called on to be higher when the protagonist 
had tempted fate (M = 3.43, SD = 2.34) than when the 
protagonist had not tempted fate (M = 2.53, SD = 
2.24), t(116) = 2.15, p = .034, d = 0.39, 95% CI = [0.03, 
0.75].
Replication. The original study design included both 
self and other scenarios (i.e., the protagonist was either 
the participant or a classmate), but no self-other differ-
ences were found. With the original authors’ approval, we 
limited the replication study to the two self conditions. In 
the aggregate replication sample (N = 8,000), participants 
judged the likelihood of being called on to be higher 
when they had tempted fate (M = 4.58, SD = 2.44) than 
when they had not tempted fate (M = 4.14, SD = 2.45), 
t(7998) = 8.08, p = 7.70e−16, d = 0.18, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.22]. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that people believe 
tempting fate increases the likelihood of a negative out-
come, though the effect size was less than half the effect 
size in the original study (d = 0.18, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.22], 
vs. original d = 0.39).
For the key confirmatory test, the original authors 
suggested that the sample should include only under-
graduate students, given the nature of the scenarios. In 
that subsample (N = 4,599), participants judged the 
likelihood of being called on to be higher when they 
had tempted fate (M = 4.61, SD = 2.42) than when they 
had not tempted fate (M = 4.07, SD = 2.36), t(4597) = 
7.57, p = 4.4e−14, d = 0.22, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.28]. The 
observed effect size (0.22) was very similar to what was 
observed with the whole sample (0.18).
Follow-up analyses. During peer review of our design 
and analysis plan, gender was suggested as a possible 
moderator of the effect. Using the undergraduate sub-
sample, we conducted a 2 × 2 ANOVA with condition 
and gender as factors. In addition to the main effect of 
condition, there was a main effect of gender, F(1, 4524) = 
31.80, p = 1.81e−8, d = 0.17, 95% CI = [0.09, 0.25]; females 
judged the likelihood of being called on to be higher 
than males. There was also a very weak interaction of 
condition and gender, F(1, 4524) = 5.10, p = .024, d = 
0.07, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.13].
19. Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus,
Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010, Study 5). Savani et al. 
(2010) examined cultural asymmetry in people’s con-
strual of behavior as choices. In their Study 5, 218 partici-
pants (90 Americans, 128 Indians) were randomly assigned 
to recall either personal actions or interpersonal actions 
and then to indicate whether the actions constituted 
choices. In a logistic hierarchical linear model with con-
strual of choice as the dependent measure, culture and 
condition (personal or interpersonal actions) as partici-
pant-level predictors, and importance of the decision as 
a trial-level covariate, the authors found no main effect of 
condition across cultures, β = −0.13, OR = 0.88, d = 0.08, 
t(101) = 0.71, p = .48. Among Americans, there was no 
difference between the proportion of personal actions 
construed as choices (M = .83, SD = .15) and the propor-
tion of interpersonal actions construed as choices (M = 
.82, SD = .14), t(88) = 0.39, p = .65, d = 0.04. However, 
Indians were less likely to construe personal actions as 
choices (M = .61, SD = .26) than to construe interpersonal 
actions as choices (M =.71, SD = .26), t(126) = −3.69, p = 
.0002, d = −0.65, 95% CI = [−1.01, −0.30].
Replication. For the replication, we conducted a hier-
archical logistic regression analysis with choice (binary) 
as the dependent variable, importance of the decision 
(ordered categorical) as a trial-level covariate nested within 
participants, and condition (categorical) as a participant-
level factor. The effect of interest was the odds of an action 
being construed as a choice, depending on the partici-
pant’s condition, controlling for the reported importance 
of the action.
After excluding participants who performed the task 
outside of university labs, as recommended by the origi-
nal authors, and those who did not respond to all 
choice and importance-of-choice questions (remaining 
N = 3,506), we found a significant main effect of condi-
tion (β = −0.43, SE = 0.03, z = −12.54, p < 2e−16, d = 
−0.24, 95% CI = [−0.27, −0.21]). Additional exploratory 
analyses revealed a significant interaction between con-
dition and importance of the decision (β = −0.08, SE = 
0.02, z = −4.23, p = 2.37e−5). Participants were less likely 
to construe personal actions as choices (M = .74, SD = 
.44) than to construe interpersonal actions as choices 
(M = .82, SD = .39), and this effect was stronger at 
higher ratings of the importance of the choice. This 
small effect (d = −0.24, 95% CI = [−0.27, −0.21]) differed 
from the original null effect (d = 0.04) among Ameri-
cans and was in the same direction as but smaller than 
the original effect among Indians (d = −0.65), but the 
present sample was highly diverse.
For the key confirmatory test of the original result 
among Indians, we selected participants from university 
labs in India who responded to all choice and importance-
of-choice questions (N = 122). In this subsample, we 
found no main effect of condition (β = −0.06, SE = 0.17, 
z = −0.34, p = .73, d = −0.03, 95% CI = [−0.18, 0.11]) 
and a significant interaction between condition and 
importance of the decision (β = 0.35, SE = 0.09, z = 
3.79, p = 1.0e−4, d = 0.19, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.34]). Indian 
participants were equally likely to construe personal 
actions (M = .63, SD = .48) and interpersonal actions 
(M = .63, SD = .48) as choices. Though there was a 
significant main effect in the full sample, the absence 
of a significant main effect in this subsample, control-
ling for importance, is inconsistent with the original 
finding that Indians are less likely to construe personal 
actions than interpersonal actions as choices. There was 
an interaction between condition and rating of the 
importance of the choice, with a pattern similar to that 
in the full sample. This moderation was not reported 
in the original article.
Follow-up analyses. The original authors suggested 
that only university samples should be included in the 
main analyses, so those are the results we report in the 
previous paragraph. In follow-up analyses of the whole 
sample, after excluding only participants who did not 
respond to all choice and importance-of-choice ques-
tions (remaining N = 5,882), we found a significant effect 
of condition (β = −0.33, SE = 0.03, z = −11.54, p < 2.0e−16, 
d = −0.18, 95% CI = [−0.21, −0.16]) and a significant inter-
action between condition and importance of the choice 
(β = −0.06, SE = 0.014, z = −4.46, p = 8.04e−6, d = −0.03, 
95% CI = [−0.06, −0.01]). In the whole sample, partic-
ipants were less likely to construe personal actions as 
choices (M = .74, SD = .44) than to construe interpersonal 
actions as choices (M = .79, SD = .40), and this effect was 
stronger at higher ratings of the importance of the choice.
20. Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002, Study 2). 
The way people living in the West think may be more rule 
based than the way people living in East Asia think. Fifty-
two European Americans (27 men, 25 women), 52 Asian 
Americans (28 men, 24 women), and 53 East Asians (27 
men, 26 women) were randomly assigned to either a 
classification-judgment condition (decide “which group 
the target object belongs to”; two thirds of the sample) or a 
similarity-judgment condition (decide “which group the tar-
get object is most similar to”; one third of the sample).
All participants categorized targets into two alterna-
tive groups. Each stimulus set consisted of two targets 
and two groups of four exemplars each. Each of the 
two target stimuli was presented separately with the 
two groups. All the exemplars in each group had a 
particular feature in common with each other and with 
one of the targets but shared a family resemblance, and 
no single common feature, with the other target, in a 
counterbalanced design (see Fig. 1). When asked 
“which group the target object belongs to,” European 
American and East Asian participants preferred to clas-
sify on the basis of a rule (M = 69% of responses for 
European Americans; M = 70% of responses for East 
Asians) rather than family resemblance, F(1, 100) = 
44.40, p < .001, r = .55. When asked “which group the 
target object is more similar to,” European Americans 
gave many more responses based on the unidimen-
sional rule (M = 69%) than on family resemblance (M = 
31%), t(17) = 3.68, p = .002, d = 1.65, 95% CI = [0.59, 
2.67]. In contrast, East Asians gave fewer rule-based 
responses (M = 41%) than family-resemblance-based 
responses (M = 59%), t(17) = −2.09, p = .05, d = −0.93, 
95% CI = [−1.85, 0.01]. The responses of Asian Americans 
were intermediate, with participants indicating no pref-
erence for the unidimensional rule (M = 46%) over fam-
ily resemblance (M = 54%), t < 1.
Replication. For the replication, we preregistered a 
plan to compare the percentage of rule-based responses 
between the belong-to and similar-to conditions. In the 
original study, European Americans showed no differ-
ence between these conditions (d = 0.00, 95% CI = [−0.15, 
0.15]), but East Asians were more likely to give rule-
based responses in the belong-to condition than in the 
similar-to condition (d = 0.67, 95% CI = [0.52, 0.81). Note 
that we planned a comparison between the experimental 
conditions, whereas Norenzayan et al. (2002) focused their 
analysis and theoretical interest on comparisons between 
cultural groups within each experimental condition.
We computed the percentage of rule-based responses 
for each participant and then tested whether the mean 
percentages for the two experimental conditions were 
equal, using a t test for independent samples. In the 
aggregate replication sample (N = 7,396), participants 
who were asked “which group the target object belongs 
to” were more likely to classify on the basis of a rule 
(M = 64%, SD = 25%) than on the basis of family resem-
blance (M = 36%, SD = 25%), and participants who were 
asked “which group the target object is more similar to” 
were more likely to classify on the basis of family resem-
blance (M = 56%, SD = 21%) than on the basis of a rule 
(M = 44%, SD = 21%). The likelihood of using a rule was 
higher in the belong-to condition compared with the 
similar-to condition, t(7227.59) = 37.05, p = 3.04e−275, 
d = 0.86, 95% CI = [0.81, 0.91]. This pattern was in the 
same direction as the original aggregate result, and the 
effect size was somewhat larger: People were more likely 
to categorize on the basis of a rule when they considered 
what group the target belonged to and more likely to 
categorize on the basis of family resemblance when they 
considered what group the target was similar to.5
Follow-up analyses. We identified a priori that this 
effect and the one reported by Tversky and Gati (1978) 
both involved similarity judgments and thus that the 
order of these study materials in Slate 2 might be par-
ticularly relevant. We tested whether Norenzayan et al.’s 
(2002) effect was moderated by whether its materials 
came before or after Tversky and Gati’s and observed 
very weak moderation by task order, t(7392) = 2.34, p = 
.02, d = 0.05, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.10].
21. Less-is-better effect (Hsee, 1998, Study 1). Hsee
(1998) demonstrated the less-is-better effect, wherein a 
less expensive gift can be perceived as more generous 
than a more expensive gift when the less expensive gift is 
a high-priced item compared with other items in its cate-
gory, and the more expensive item is a low-priced item 
compared with other items in its category. In Hsee’s Study 
1, 83 participants imagined that they were about to study 
abroad and had received a goodbye gift from a friend. In 
one condition, participants imagined receiving a $45 scarf 
bought in a store where the prices of scarves ranged from 
$5 to $50. In the other condition, participants imagined 
receiving a $55 coat bought in a store where the prices of 
coats ranged from $50 to $500. Participants in the scarf 
condition considered their gift giver significantly more 
generous (M = 5.63; scale from 0, not generous at all, to 
6, extremely generous) than did those in the coat condi -
tion (M = 5.00), t(82) = 3.13, p = .002, d = 0.69, 95% CI = 
[0.24, 1.13], despite the gift being objectively less expensive.
In the replication, the dollar values were approxi-
mately adjusted for inflation. We converted the amounts 
Fig. 1. Examples of targets and groups used in the replication of 
Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett’s (2002) Study 2. Each of the 
two target objects in each set was presented separately with the two 
groups in order to achieve a counterbalanced design. For the flowers, 
the defining feature was the stem length; for the geometric figures, 
it was the topmost string.
to local currencies at sites where U.S. dollars would be 
relatively unfamiliar to participants. In the aggregate 
replication sample (N = 7,646), participants in the scarf 
condition considered their gift giver significantly more 
generous (M = 5.50, SD = 0.89) than did those in the 
coat condition (M = 4.61, SD = 1.34), t(6569.67) = 34.20, 
p = 4.5e−236, d = 0.78, 95% CI = [0.74, 0.83]. This result 
is consistent with the less-is-better effect, and the effect 
size was slightly larger than in the original demonstra-
tion (d = 0.78, 95% CI = [0.74, 0.83], vs. original d = 
0.69).
22. Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009, Study
1a). Gray and Wegner (2009) examined the attribution 
of intentionality and responsibility as a function of per-
ceived moral agency—the ability to direct and control 
one’s moral decisions. In their Study 1a, 69 participants 
read about an event involving a person high on moral 
agency (an adult man) and a person low on moral agency 
(a baby). In one condition, the man knocked over a tray 
of glasses, which resulted in harm to the baby. In the 
other condition, the baby knocked over the tray of 
glasses, which resulted in harm to the man. Participants 
then rated the degree to which the person who commit-
ted the act was responsible, how intentional the act was, 
and how much pain was felt by the victim (scales from 1 
to 7). The adult man (M = 5.29, SD = 1.86) was evaluated 
as more responsible for committing the act than was the 
baby (M = 3.86, SD = 1.64), t(68) = 3.32, p = .001, d = 
0.80, 95% CI = [0.31, 1.29]. Likewise, the adult man (M = 
4.05, SD = 2.05) was rated as acting more intentionally 
than the baby (M = 3.07, SD = 1.55), t(68) = 2.20, p = .03, 
d = 0.53. Finally, when on the receiving end of the act, 
the adult man (M = 4.63, SD = 1.15) was viewed as feel-
ing less pain compared with the baby (M = 5.76, SD = 
1.55), t(68) = 3.49, p = .001, d = 0.85.
Replication. The effect of condition on perceived 
responsibility was identified as the primary relationship 
for replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
8,002), the adult man (M = 5.41, SD = 1.63) was evaluated 
as more responsible for committing the act than the baby 
(M = 3.77, SD = 1.79), t(7913.89) = 42.62, p < 3.32e−285, 
d = 0.95, 95% CI = [0.91, 1.00]. This result is consistent 
with the hypothesis that an adult’s perceived responsibil-
ity for harming a baby is greater than a baby’s perceived 
responsibility for harming an adult. The effect size in the 
replication was slightly larger than the original result (d = 
0.95, 95% CI = [0.91, 1.00], vs. original d = 0.80).
Follow-up analyses. There were two additional depen-
dent variables for secondary analysis: perceived inten-
tionality and pain felt by the victim. The adult man (M = 
3.62, SD = 1.89) was rated as acting more intentionally 
than the baby (M = 2.73, SD = 1.64), t(7864.62) = 22.51, 
p = 8.3e−109, d = 0.50, 95% CI = [0.46, 0.55]. And, when on 
the receiving end of the act, the adult man (M = 4.66 SD = 
1.25) was viewed as feeling less pain compared with the 
baby (M = 5.44, SD = 1.25), t(7989) = 27.54, p = 1.5e−159, 
d = 0.62, 95% CI = [0.57, 0.66].
23. Moral violations and desire for cleansing (Zhong
& Liljenquist, 2006, Study 2). Zhong and Liljenquist 
(2006) investigated whether moral violations can induce 
a desire for cleansing. In their Study 2, under the guise of 
a study on the relationship between personality and 
handwriting, 27 participants hand-copied a first-person 
account of an ethical act (helping a coworker) or unethi-
cal act (sabotaging a coworker). Then, participants rated 
the desirability of five cleansing products and five non-
cleansing products (scale from 1, not at all, to 7, very 
much). Participants who copied the unethical account 
(M = 4.95, SD = 0.84) reported that the cleansing prod-
ucts were more desirable than did participants who cop-
ied the ethical account (M = 3.75, SD = 1.32), F(1, 25) = 
6.99, p = .01, d = 1.02, 95% CI = [0.39, 2.44]. There was no 
difference between the unethical (M = 3.85, SD = 1.21) 
and ethical (M = 3.91, SD = 1.03) conditions in ratings of 
noncleansing products, F(1, 25) = 0.02, p = .89, d = 0.05.
Replication. The effect of interest for replication was 
whether condition affected ratings of the cleansing prod-
ucts. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 7,001), after 
participants who copied less than half of the first-person 
account were removed, participants who copied the 
unethical account (M = 3.95, SD = 1.43) and those who 
copied the ethical account (M = 3.95, SD = 1.45) rated the 
cleansing products as similarly desirable, t(6999) = −0.11, 
p = .91, d = 0.00, 95% CI = [−0.05, 0.04]. This result is not 
consistent with the hypothesis that copying an account 
of an unethical action increases the desirability of cleans-
ing products compared with copying an account of an 
ethical action.
Follow-up analyses. The original study revealed no dif-
ference by condition in ratings of noncleansing products. 
In the replication, a 2 (condition) × 2 (type of product) 
linear mixed-effects model with participant as a random 
effect yielded no interaction, t(6999) = −0.57, p = .57, 
d = −0.01, 95% CI = [−0.06, 0.03]. Moreover, there was no 
difference between the ethical (M = 3.12, SD = 1.08) and 
unethical (M = 3.11, SD = 1.05) conditions in ratings of 
noncleansing products, t(6999) = 0.63, p = .53, d = 0.02, 
95% CI = [−0.03, 0.06].
24. Assimilation and contrast effects in question
sequences (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991, Study 1). In 
this study, 100 participants answered a question about 
life satisfaction in a specific domain, “How satisfied are 
you with your relationship?” and a question about life 
satisfaction in general, “How satisfied are you with your 
life-as-a-whole?” Participants were randomly assigned to 
the order in which they answered the specific and general 
questions. When the specific question was asked first, the 
correlation between the responses to the two questions 
was strong (r = .67, p < .05). When the specific question 
was asked second, the correlation between the responses 
was weaker (r = .32, p < .05). The difference between 
these correlations was significant, z = 2.32, p < .01, q = 
0.48, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.88].
The authors suggested that the specific-first condi-
tion made the relationship more accessible, so that 
participants were more likely to incorporate informa-
tion about their relationship when evaluating their life 
satisfaction more generally. Because responses to the 
two items were linked by the accessibility of relation-
ship information, they were correlated. In contrast, in 
the specific-second condition, relationship satisfaction 
was not necessarily accessible when participants evalu-
ated their overall life satisfaction, so they could draw 
on any number of different areas to generate their 
response to the general question. Thus, the correlation 
between responses to the two items was weaker than 
in the specific-first condition.
Replication. In the aggregate replication sample (N = 
7,460), when the specific question was asked first, the 
correlation between the responses to the two questions 
was moderate (r = .38). When the specific question was 
asked second, the correlation between the responses was 
slightly stronger (r = .44). The difference between these 
correlations was significant, z = −3.03, p = .002, q = −0.07, 
95% CI = [−0.12, −0.02]. The replication effect was in the 
direction opposite that of the original effect, and the rep-
lication effect size was much smaller than the original 
result (q = −0.07, 95% CI = [−0.12, −0.02], vs. q = 0.48).
Follow-up analysis. In the original procedure, no other 
measures preceded the questions. This particular effect 
concerns the influence of question context, so it is reason-
able to presume that task order will have an impact on it. 
Therefore, the data for the most direct comparison with 
the original were provided by the sites where this task was 
administered first in the slate. In that subsample (N = 470), 
when the specific question was asked first, the correlation 
between the responses to the two questions was strong 
(r = .41). When the specific question was asked second, 
the correlation between the responses was the same (r = 
.41). The difference between these correlations was not 
significant, z = 0.01, p = .99, q = 0.00, 95% CI = [−0.18, 0.18].
25. Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative
desirability (Shafir, 1993, Study 1). In this study, 170 
participants imagined that they were on the jury of a 
custody case and had to choose between two parents. 
One of the parents had both more strongly positive and 
more strongly negative characteristics (the extreme par-
ent) than the other parent (the average parent). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to either decide to award 
custody to one parent or decide to deny custody to one 
parent. Participants were more likely to both award (64%) 
and deny (55%) custody to the extreme parent than to 
the average parent, and the sum of these probabilities 
was significantly greater than 100%, z = 2.48, p = .013, 
d = 0.35, 95% CI = [−0.04, 0.68]. This finding was consistent 
with the hypothesis that negative features are weighted 
more strongly than positive features when people are 
rejecting options, and positive features are weighted more 
strongly than negative features when people are selecting 
options (Shafir, 1993).
In the aggregate replication sample (N = 7,901), par-
ticipants were less likely to both award (45.5%) and 
deny (47.6%) custody to the extreme parent than to the 
average parent, and the sum of these probabilities 
(93%) was significantly smaller than the 100% one 
would expect if choosing and rejecting were comple-
mentary, z = −6.10, p = 1.1e−9, d = −0.13, 95% CI = 
[−0.18, −0.09]. This result was small in magnitude and 
in the direction opposite that of the original finding, 
and it is incompatible with the hypothesis that negative 
features are weighted more strongly when people are 
rejecting options and positive features are weighted 
more strongly when people are selecting options.
26. Priming “heat” increases belief in global warm-
ing (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014, Study 
3a). Zaval et  al. (2014) investigated how beliefs in cli-
mate change could be influenced by immediately avail-
able information about temperature. In their Study 3a, 
300 Mechanical Turk workers reported their beliefs about 
global warming after completing one of three scrambled-
sentence tasks; one task primed the concept of “heat,” 
another primed the concept of “cold,” and the third had 
no theme (control condition). There was a significant 
effect of condition on both belief in global warming, F(2, 
288) = 3.88, p = .02, and concern about it, F(2, 288) = 
4.74, p = .01, controlling for demographic and actual-
temperature data. Post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed 
that on a 4-point scale (from 1, not at all convinced, to 4, 
completely convinced), participants in the heat-priming 
condition expressed stronger belief (M = 2.7, SD = 1.1) in 
global warming than did both participants in the cold-
priming condition (M = 2.4, SD = 1.1), t(191) = 1.9, p = 
.06, d = 0.27, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.49], and participants in the 
control condition (M = 2.3, SD = 1.1), t(193) = 2.23, p = 
.03, d = 0.37, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.59]. Likewise, participants 
in the heat-priming condition expressed greater concern 
(M = 2.4, SD = 1.0) about global warming than did both 
participants in the cold-priming condition (M = 2.1, SD = 
1.0; scale from 1, not at all worried, to 4, completely wor-
ried), t(191) = 2.15, p = .03, d = 0.31, 95% CI = [0.03, 0.59], 
and participants in the control condition (M = 2.1, SD = 
1.0), t(193) = 2.23, p = .02, d = 0.31, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.59].
Replication. For the direct replication, the mean dif-
ference in concern about global warming between the 
heat- and cold-priming conditions was evaluated. In the 
aggregate replication sample, after participants who made 
errors in the sentence-unscrambling task were excluded 
(remaining N = 4,204), participants in the heat-priming con-
dition (M = 2.47, SD = 0.90) and participants in the cold-
priming condition (M = 2.50, SD = 0.89) expressed similar 
levels of concern about global warming, t(4202) = −1.09, 
p = .27, d = −0.03, 95% CI = [−0.09, 0.03]. This result is 
not consistent with the hypothesis that temperature prim-
ing alters concern about global warming. The effect was 
small, much weaker than the original finding, and in the 
opposite direction (d = −0.03, 95% CI = [−0.09, 0.03], vs. 
original d = 0.31).
Translations of the scrambled-sentence task may 
have disrupted the effectiveness of the manipulation. 
Therefore, the most direct comparison with the original 
effect size was provided by the sites where the test was 
administered in English only. In this subsample (N = 
2,939), participants in the heat-priming condition (M = 
2.40, SD = 0.90) also expressed similar concern about 
global warming compared with participants in the cold-
priming condition (M = 2.44, SD = 0.89), t(2937) = −0.18, 
p = .24, d = −0.04, 95% CI = [−0.12, 0.03].
Follow-up analyses. Belief in global warming was 
included as a secondary dependent variable. In the aggre-
gate replication sample (N = 4,212), participants in the 
heat-priming condition (M = 3.25, SD = 0.84) and partici-
pants in the cold-priming condition (M = 3.25, SD = 0.82) 
expressed similar belief in global warming, t(4210) = 0.50, 
p = .62, d = 0.00, 95% CI = [−0.06, 0.06]. In the subsample of 
participants who took the test in English, participants in the 
heat-priming condition (M = 3.25, SD = 0.86) and partici-
pants in the cold-priming condition (M = 3.23, SD = 0.85) 
also expressed similar belief in global warming, t(2940) = 
1.40, p = .16, d = 0.02, 95% CI = [−0.05, 0.09]. Neither of 
these follow-up analyses was consistent with the original 
study’s finding that temperature priming influenced belief 
in global warming.
27. Perceived intentionality for side effects (Knobe,
2003, Study 1). Knobe (2003) investigated whether help-
ful and harmful side effects are differentially perceived as 
being intended. Consider, for example, an agent who 
knows that his or her behavior will have a particular side 
effect, but does not care whether the side effect does or 
does not occur. If the agent chooses to go ahead with the 
behavior and the side effect occurs, do people believe 
that the agent brought about the side effect intentionally? 
Knobe had participants read vignettes about such situa-
tions and found that participants were more likely to 
believe the agent brought about the side effect intention-
ally when the side effect was harmful compared with 
when it was helpful. Eighty-two percent of participants in 
the harmful-side-effect condition said that the agent 
brought about the side effect intentionally, whereas 23% 
of those in the helpful-side-effect condition said that the 
agent brought about the side effect intentionally, χ2(1, 
N = 78) = 27.2, p < .001, d = 1.45, 95% CI = [0.79, 2.77]. 
Also, ratings of the blame deserved by agents who 
brought about harmful side effects were higher than rat-
ings of the praise deserved by agents who brought about 
helpful side effects (scales from 1 to 7), t(120) = 8.4, p < 
.001, d = 1.55, 95% CI = [1.14, 1.95]. The total amount of 
blame or praise attributed to the agent was associated 
with belief that the agent brought about the side effect 
intentionally, r(120) = .53, p < .001, d = 0.63, 95% CI = 
[0.26, 0.99].
Replication. For the direct replication, ratings of inten-
tionality in the harmful- and helpful-side-effect conditions 
were compared using a 7-point scale rather than a dichot-
omous judgment. In the aggregate replication sample 
(N = 7,982), participants in the harmful-side-effect condition 
(M = 5.34, SD =1.94) said that the agent brought about the 
side effect intentionally to a greater extent than did partici-
pants in the helpful-side-effect condition (M = 2.17, SD = 
1.69), t(7843.86) = 78.11, p < 1.68e−305, d = 1.75, 95% CI = 
[1.70, 1.80]. This is consistent with the original result, and 
the effect was somewhat stronger in the replication (d = 
1.75, 95% CI = [1.70, 1.80], vs. original d = 1.45).
Follow-up analyses. Blame and praise ratings were 
assessed as a secondary replication. Ratings of the blame 
deserved by agents who brought about harmful side 
effects were higher (M = 6.03, SD = 1.26) than ratings of 
the praise deserved by agents who brought about help-
ful side effects (M = 2.54, SD = 1.60), t(7553.82) = 108.15, 
p < 1.68e−305, d = 2.42, 95% CI = [2.36, 2.48]. This is also 
consistent with the original result, and the effect size is 
notably larger (2.42 vs. 1.55).
28. Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati,
1978, Study 2). Tversky and Gati (1978) investigated 
the relationship between directionality and similarity. In 
their Study 2, 144 participants made 21 similarity ratings 
of country pairs in which one country (e.g., the United 
States) was shown in a pretest to be more prominent 
than the other (e.g., Mexico). In a between-participants 
manipulation, the pair was presented with either the 
more prominent country first (e.g., United States-Mexico) 
or the less prominent country first (e.g., Mexico-United 
States). Two counterbalanced versions of the survey were 
created such that the more prominent country and the 
less prominent country were presented first “about an 
equal number of times” (p. 87). Results indicated that 
participants’ similarity ratings were higher when less 
prominent countries were displayed first than when more 
prominent countries were displayed first, t(153) = 2.99, 
p = .003, d = 0.48, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.80], and that higher 
similarity ratings were given to the version of each pair 
that listed the more prominent country second, t(20) = 
2.92, p = .001, d = 0.64, 95% CI = [0.16, 1.10].
A follow-up study (N = 46) with the same design 
examined ratings of differences rather than similarities. 
Results were consistent with the first study: Participants’ 
difference ratings were higher when the more promi-
nent countries were displayed first than when the less 
prominent countries were displayed first, t(45) = 2.24, 
p < .05, d = 0.66, 95% CI = [0.06, 1.25], and higher dif-
ference ratings were given to the version of each pair 
that listed the more prominent country first, t(20) = 
2.72, p < .01, d = 0.59, 95% CI = [0.12, 1.05].
Replication. For the replication, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two counterbalanced ver-
sions of the survey and were randomly assigned to rate 
either similarities or differences between the two coun-
tries in each pair. Following the design of the original 
studies, we considered the participants who provided 
similarity and difference judgments to be two indepen-
dent samples. Therefore, each site had about half as 
much data for its critical test as for the tests of the other 
27 effects. The similarity ratings were the primary focus 
for direct replication, and the difference ratings were 
examined in a secondary analysis.
For each participant in the aggregate similarities 
sample (N = 3,549), we created an asymmetry score, 
calculated as the average similarity rating when the 
prominent country appeared second minus the average 
similarity rating when the prominent country appeared 
first. Across participants, the asymmetry score was not 
different from zero, t(3548) = 0.60, p = .55, d = 0.01, 
95% CI = [−0.02, 0.04]; the order of presentation of more 
and less prominent countries did not influence evalu-
ations of their similarity. In addition, we observed that 
the average similarity ratings in one counterbalancing 
condition were 8.78 (SD = 2.44) and 8.84 (SD = 2.43) 
when the more prominent country was presented first 
and second, respectively, whereas the corresponding 
average similarity ratings in the other counterbalancing 
condition were higher, M = 10.14 (SD = 2.42) and M = 
10.09 (SD = 2.44), respectively. In summary, there was no 
evidence of the key effect of country order (prominent 
country first vs. second), and similarity ratings were 
different between the counterbalancing conditions, a 
procedural effect.
Then, we reproduced the original by-item analysis. 
Participants’ similarity ratings were nearly identical 
when the less prominent country was displayed first 
(M = 9.42, SD = 2.61) and when the more prominent 
country was displayed first (M = 9.43, SD = 2.57), 
t(20) = −0.29, p = .78, d = −0.04, 95% CI = [−0.35, 0.26]. 
Thus, the overall replication effect size was near zero, 
and the effect was in the direction opposite the original 
findings.
Follow-up analyses. We conducted the same analy-
ses on the difference ratings (N = 3,582). The asymmetry 
score was not different from zero, t(3581) = 1.70, p = .09, 
d = 0.03, 95% CI = [−0.004, 0.061]; the order of presenta-
tion of more and less prominent countries did not influ-
ence evaluations of their difference.
The by-item analysis showed that participant’s dif-
ference ratings were very similar when the more promi-
nent country was displayed first (M = 11.19, SD = 2.54) 
compared with when the less prominent country was 
displayed first (M = 11.25, SD = 2.54), t(20) = 1.1, p = 
.29, d = 0.17, 95% CI = [−0.14, 0.47].
Order effects in general are reported in the Results 
section. As noted earlier, we identified a priori that this 
effect and Norenzayan et  al.’s (2002) effect both 
involved similarity judgments and thus that the order 
of these study materials might be particularly relevant. 
We compared whether the asymmetry score for Tversky 
and Gati’s (1978) effect was moderated by whether the 
measures for Norenzayan et al.’s effect appeared before 
or after, and observed no moderation for the primary 
similarities test, t(3547) = −0.48, p = .63, d = −0.02, 95% 
CI = [−0.08, 0.05], or for the secondary differences test, 
t(3580) = −0.23, p = .82, d = −0.01, 95% CI = [−0.07, 
0.06].
Results
For each of the 28 effects, Table 2 presents the original 
study’s effect size (with 95% CI), the median effect size 
for the replication samples, and the weighted mean of 
the replication effect sizes (with 95% CI) after pooling 
the data of all the samples. It also shows the percentage 
of samples in which the null hypothesis was rejected 
and the effect was in the expected direction, the per-
centage of samples in which the null hypothesis was 
rejected and the effect was in the unexpected direction, 
and the percentage of samples in which the null 
hypothesis was not rejected. The effects are ordered 
from the largest global replication effect size consistent 
with the original study, at the top of the table, to the 
largest opposite-direction effect, at the bottom. For 
original studies that had shown cultural differences, we 
present results separately for cultures with WEIRD 
scores above the mean (classified as “WEIRD” samples) 
Table 2. Summary of Effect Sizes and Results of Significance Tests Across Replication Samples for Each of the 28 Effects
Replication
Results of significance testing 
(p < .05; % of samples)
Effect
Original study’s
effect size
Median 
effect size
Global effect
size
Negative 
estimated 
effect
Non-
significant 
effect
Positive 
estimated 
effect
Cohen's q effect size
Disgust sensitivity predicts homophobia 
(Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009)
0.70 [0.05, 1.36] 0.03 0.05 [0.01, 0.10] 3.39 93.22 3.39
Assimilation and contrast effects in 
question sequences (Schwarz, Strack, 
& Mai, 1991)
0.48 [0.07, 0.88] −0.06 −0.07 [−0.12, −0.02] 5.08 91.53 3.39
Cohen's d effect size
Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & 
Kitayama, 2002)
  WEIRD samples 2.47 [1.46, 3.49] 1.78 1.81 [1.75, 1.88] 0.00 0.00 100.00
 Less WEIRD samples 0.74 [−0.12, 1.59] 1.86 1.84 [1.74, 1.94] 0.00 0.00 100.00
Perceived intentionality for side effects 
(Knobe, 2003)
1.45 [0.79, 2.77] 1.94 1.75 [1.70, 1.80] 0.00 5.08 94.92
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double 
effect (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, 
& Mikhail, 2007)
2.50 [2.22, 2.86] 1.42 1.35 [1.28, 1.41] 0.00 0.00 100.00
False consensus: supermarket scenario 
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977)
0.99 [0.24, 2.29] 1.08 1.18 [1.13, 1.23] 0.00 0.00 100.00
Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009) 0.80 [0.31, 1.29] 1.04 0.95 [0.91, 1.00] 0.00 5.00 95.00
False consensus: traffic-ticket scenario 
(Ross et al., 1977)
0.80 [0.22, 1.87] 0.89 0.95 [0.90, 1.00] 0.00 6.67 93.33
Preferences for formal versus intuitive 
Reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, 
& Nisbett, 2002)
WEIRD samples 0.00 [−0.15, 0.15] 0.95 0.95 [0.90, 1.00] 0.00 2.33 97.67
 Less WEIRD samples 0.67 [0.52, 0.81] 0.50 0.56 [0.46, 0.65] 0.00 42.86 57.14
Less-is-better effect (Hsee, 1998) 0.69 [0.24, 1.13] 0.86 0.78 [0.74, 0.83] 0.00 10.53 89.47
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic 
status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)
WEIRD samples 0.83 [0.37, 1.28] 0.66 0.55 [0.49, 0.61] 4.35 30.43 65.22
 Less WEIRD samples −0.59 [−0.99, −0.19] −0.10 0.03 [−0.05, 0.13] 5.56 83.33 11.11
Effect of framing on decision making 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
1.08 [0.71, 1.45] 0.38 0.40 [0.35, 0.45] 0.00 54.55 45.45
Moral foundations of liberals versus 
conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009)
0.52 [0.40, 0.63] 0.23 0.29 [0.25, 0.34] 0.00 75.00 25.00
Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double 
effect (Hauser et al., 2007)
0.34 [0.26, 0.42] 0.22 0.25 [0.20, 0.30] 0.00 81.67 18.33
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & 
Gilovich, 2008)
0.39 [0.03, 0.75] 0.23 0.18 [0.14, 0.22] 1.69 72.88 25.42
Consumerism undermines trust (Bauer, 
Wilkie, Kim, & Bodenhausen, 2012)
0.87 [0.41, 1.34] 0.16 0.12 [0.07, 0.17] 1.85 87.04 11.11
Influence of incidental anchors on 
judgment (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008)
0.30 [0.02, 0.58] 0.00 0.04 [−0.01, 0.09] 3.39 91.53 5.08
Vertical position and power (Giessner  
& Schubert, 2007)
0.55 [0.05, 1.05] 0.01 0.03 [−0.01, 0.08] 1.69 94.92 3.39
Directionality and similarity (Tversky 
& Gati, 1978)
0.48 [0.16, 0.80] 0.03 0.01 [−0.02, 0.04] 2.04 97.96 0.00
(continued)
Replication
Results of significance testing 
(p < .05; % of samples)
Effect
Original study’s
effect size
Median 
effect size
Global effect
size
Negative 
estimated 
effect
Non-
significant 
effect
Positive 
estimated 
effect
Moral violations and desire for cleansing 
(Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)
1.02 [0.39, 2.44] 0.00 0.00 [−0.05, 0.04] 0.00 94.23 5.77
Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, 
Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)
0.49 [0.001, 0.973] −0.02 −0.02 [−0.07, 0.03] 0.00 100.00 0.00
Social value orientation and family 
size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & 
Joireman, 1997)
0.19 [< 0.001, 0.47] 0.06 −0.03 [−0.08, 0.02] 0.00 98.15 1.85
Priming “heat” increases belief in global 
warming (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & 
Weber, 2014)
0.31 [0.03, 0.59] 0.00 −0.03 [−0.09, 0.03] 5.36 89.29 5.36
Disfluency engages analytic processing 
(Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)
0.63 [−0.004, 1.25] −0.07 −0.03 [−0.08, 0.01] 1.52 96.97 1.52
Sociometric status and well-being (Anderson, 
Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)
0.57 [0.20, 0.93] −0.05 −0.04 [−0.09, −0.004] 0.00 94.92 5.08
Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001) 0.74 [< 0.001, 1.74] −0.06 −0.08 [−0.13, −0.03] 3.33 95.00 1.67
Effect of choosing versus rejecting on 
relative desirability (Shafir, 1993)
0.35 [−0.04, 0.68] −0.04 −0.13 [−0.18, −0.09] 18.97 79.31 1.72
Construing actions as choices (Savani, 
Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)
WEIRD samples 0.08 [−0.33, 0.50] −0.24 −0.21 [−0.23, −0.18] 46.51 53.49 0.00
Less WEIRD samples −0.65 [−1.01, −0.30] −0.14 −0.12 [−0.16, −0.08] 28.57 71.43 0.00
Note: Numbers inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. For the original effect sizes, we calculated the confidence intervals using cell sample 
sizes when they were available and assumed equal distribution across conditions when they were not available. For original studies that observed a 
difference between a sample from a WEIRD (i.e., Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) culture and a sample from a particular less 
WEIRD culture, we present summary results for WEIRD and all less WEIRD samples separately to avoid potentially misrepresenting replication success 
within subsamples. Figure 2 plots the distribution of effect sizes across all samples for each of the 28 effects included in this replication project.
Table 2. (Continued)
and those with WEIRD scores below the mean (classi-
fied as “less WEIRD” samples), to avoid aggregating 
results when effects might be anticipated in some sam-
ples but not others (see the next section for an expla-
nation of how WEIRD scores were calculated). (In these 
cases, the effects are ordered according to the global 
replication effect size in the WEIRD samples.) However, 
the differences observed between samples in the origi-
nal research may not be expected to be replicated in 
our comparisons of aggregated cultural contexts. There-
fore, we avoid drawing conclusions about replication 
of original cultural differences beyond what we have 
already discussed in reporting the findings for indi-
vidual studies and what we discuss later in presenting 
our exploratory cultural comparisons.
Overall, after we adjusted for multiple comparisons, 
the replications for 14 of the 28 effects (50%) showed 
significant evidence in the same direction as the origi-
nal finding, 1 replication provided evidence that was 
weakly consistent with the original (4%),6 and 13 
replications (46%) yielded a null effect or evidence in 
the direction opposite the original finding.7 Larger 
aggregate effects tended to have a higher percentage 
of significant positive results than smaller aggregate 
effects, as would be expected given the power of the 
individual samples to detect the observed aggregate 
effect size. For 8 of the supported effects, 89% to 100% 
of the individual samples had significant results, and 
for the other 6, 11% to 46% of the individual samples 
had significant results. As would be expected, for effects 
that were null in the aggregate, there were occasional 
significant results both in the original finding’s direction 
and in the opposite direction, but more than 90% of 
the individual samples typically showed a null effect. 
Most observed pooled effect sizes (21 of 28; 75%) were 
smaller than the original findings in WEIRD samples, 
but some (7 of 28; 25%) were larger.
Figure 2 provides a summary illustration of the 28 
studies including (a) estimates of the aggregate effect 
sizes, (b) the effect-size estimate for each individual 
sample, and (c) the original studies’ effect-size estimates 
(results for samples from WEIRD and less WEIRD cul-
tures are identified separately for the 4 original studies 
that had samples from two cultures). A figure showing 
separate distributions for WEIRD and less WEIRD repli-
cation samples is available in at https://osf.io/5yzn8/.
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Construing Actions as Choices (Savani et al., 2010)
Affect & Risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001)
Effect of Choosing vs. Rejecting (Shafir, 1993)
Disfluency Engages Analytic Processing (Alter et al., 2007)
Structure Promotes Goal Pursuit (Kay et al., 2014)
Priming “Heat” (Zaval et al., 2014)
SMS & Well-Being (Anderson et al., 2012)
Directionality & Similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978)
Vertical Position & Power (Giessner & Schubert, 2007)
Moral Violations & Cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)
SVO and Family Size (Van Lange et al., 1997)
Influence of Incidental Anchors (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008)
Consumerism Undermines Trust (Bauer et al., 2012)
Trolley Dilemma 2 (Hauser et al., 2007)
Reluctance to Tempt Fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008)
Moral Foundations of Liberals vs. Conservatives (Graham et al., 2009)
Cardinal Direction & SES (Huang et al., 2014)
Effect of Framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
Less-Is-Better Effect (Hsee, 1998)
Preferences for Formal vs. Intuitive Reasoning (Norenzayan et al., 2002)
False Consensus: Traffic-Ticket Scenario (Ross et al., 1977)
Moral Typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009)
False Consensus: Supermarket Scenario (Ross et al., 1977)
Trolley Dilemma 1 (Hauser et al., 2007)
Perceived Intentionality for Side Effects (Knobe, 2003)
Correspondence Bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002)
Assimilation & Contrast Effects (Schwarz et al., 1991)
Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Homophobia (Inbar et al., 2009)
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Effect-Size r
Cohen’s q
Original Effect Size
Fig. 2. Effect-size distributions for the 28 effects. The effect size for each replication sample is plotted as a short vertical line; the aggregate 
estimates are plotted as longer, thick vertical lines. Results for samples with fewer than 15 participants because of exclusions are not plot-
ted, and some samples were excluded because of errors in administration. A detailed accounting of all exclusions is available at https://
manylabsopenscience.github.io/ML2_data_cleaning. Positive effect sizes indicate effects consistent with the direction of the original findings 
in the original Western samples. Original effect sizes are indicated by the gray-filled triangles. If the original study had a cultural comparison, 
the gray triangle shows the result for the WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) sample, and the open triangle 
shows the results for the less WEIRD sample. Note that for the top two rows of the figure, effect sizes were calculated as Cohen’s q (the 
estimate of the difference between two correlations); all other effect sizes were calculated as r. SES = socioeconomic status; SVO = social 
value orientation; SMS = sociometric status.
Variation across samples and settings
Our central interest was the variation in effect estimates 
across all samples and settings. In a linear mixed model 
with samples and studies as random effects, we compared 
the intraclass correlation (ICC) of samples across effects 
(ICC =.782), which was quite large, with the intraclass 
correlation of effects across samples (ICC = .004), which 
was near zero. In other words, to predict effect sizes 
across the 28 findings and dozens of samples studied in 
this project, it is very useful to know the effect in question 
and barely useful to know the sample in which it was 
being studied.
Next, we examined whether specific effects were sen-
sitive to variation in sample or setting. For each of the 
28 replication studies, we examined variability in effect 
sizes using a random-effects meta-analysis (with 
restricted maximum likelihood as the estimator for 
between-study variance) and established heterogeneity 
estimates—Q, I2, and tau—to determine if the amount 
of variability across samples exceeded that expected as 
a result of measurement error (see Table 3). Because 
the study procedures were nearly identical (except for 
language translations) across the individual studies, 
variation exceeding measurement error was likely to be 
due to effects of sample or setting and interactions 
between sample and materials. Eleven of the 28 effects 
(39%) showed significant heterogeneity according to the 
Q test (p < .001). Notably, of those showing such vari-
ability, the effect sizes for 8 were among the 10 largest 
effect sizes. Only one of the nonsignificant replication 
effects (i.e., replication of Van Lange et al., 1997) showed 
significant heterogeneity according to the Q test.
The I2 statistic indicated substantial heterogeneity for 
some of the tests; 10 (36%) showed at least medium 
heterogeneity (I2 ≥ 50%), and 2 showed heterogeneity 
larger than 75% (tests of Huang et al., 2014, and Knobe, 
2003; see Table 3). Note, however, that estimation of 
heterogeneity is rather imprecise, as evidenced by the 
many large confidence intervals for I2, particularly for 
the cases with low estimates of heterogeneity. Fifteen 
I2 effects had a lower bound of 0%. Also, the I2 statistic 
increases if sample size increases, so the large samples 
in this project may explain the large I2 statistics that 
were observed (Rücker, Schwarzer, Carpenter, & 
Schumacher, 2008). As in the first Many Labs project 
(Klein et al., 2014a), heterogeneity was greater for large 
effects than for small effects. The Spearman rank-order 
correlation between aggregate effect size and I2 was .56.
Finally, as estimated with tau, only 1 effect (replica-
tion of Huang et al., 2014) showed substantial standard 
deviation among effect sizes (.24), and 8 others showed 
modest heterogeneity near .10. Most of the effects, 19 
of 28 (68%), showed near zero heterogeneity as esti-
mated by tau. Thus, according to this test, there was 
modest evidence of heterogeneity overall, and when it 
was observed in individual effects, it was quite small.
Table 3 summarizes the tests of moderation by lab 
versus online setting. After we adjusted for multiple 
comparisons, just one result showed a significant dif-
ference between lab and online samples (replication of 
Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). For this effect, the overall 
result was not different from zero, and approximately 
95% of the individual samples showed null effects. 
These results suggest the need for some caution in 
concluding that effects are moderated by whether data 
are collected in the lab or online.
For exploratory cultural comparisons, we computed 
a WEIRDness (Henrich et al., 2010) score for each sam-
ple based on its country of origin, using public country 
rankings. Western countries were given a score of 1, 
and Eastern countries were given a score of 0. Devel-
oped countries were given a score of 1, and emerging 
countries were given a score of 0. The list of developed 
countries was obtained from the United Nations (United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Development Policy and Analysis Division, 2014). Scores 
for education, industrialization, and democratization 
were taken from the United Nations’ Education Index 
(Education Index, 2017) and Industrial Development 
Report (United Nations Industrial Development Orga-
nization, 2015) and from the Global Democracy Rank-
ing (Campbell, Pölzlbauer, Barth, & Pölzlbauer, 2015). 
We then computed a global WEIRDness score for each 
sample by taking the mean across its scores. Details on 
the computation and specific links to the country rank-
ings are available at https://osf.io/b7qrt/. Samples from 
countries with WEIRDness scores above the mean across 
samples were categorized as WEIRD (Slate 1: n = 42; 
Slate 2: n = 44), and samples from countries with 
WEIRDness scores below the mean were categorized 
as “less WEIRD” (Slate 1: n = 22; Slate 2: n = 17; see 
Fig. 3 for the distribution of WEIRDness scores).
Table 3 also presents heterogeneity statistics for com-
parisons of the WEIRD and less WEIRD cultures. For 
13 of the 14 replication effects that were reliable and 
in the same direction as the effects in the original stud-
ies, the effect was observed with similar magnitude in 
the WEIRD and the less WEIRD samples. The only 
exception was Huang et al.’s (2014) effect; in this case, 
the WEIRD samples showed an effect in the same direc-
tion as the original WEIRD sample, and the less WEIRD 
samples showed no overall effect. Both showed wide 
variability across samples. This result is relatively con-
sistent with the original study, in which Hong Kong and 
U.S. participants showed effects in opposite directions, 
presumably because of observed between-sample dif-
ferences in whether wealthy people tended to live in 
the north or south. It is likely that there is wide vari-
ability in whether wealthy people tend to live in the 
 Table 3. Results of Heterogeneity Tests for Each of the 28 Effects
Heterogeneity test
All samples (no moderators) WEIRD versus less WEIRD samples Lab versus online samples
Effect ESa Tau Q df p I 2 Tau Q p I 2 Tau Q p I 2
Cohen's q effect size
Disgust sensitivity predicts 
homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, 
& Bloom, 2009)
0.05 .00 55.80 58 .56 3%
[0%, 30%]
0.00 2.89 .09 0%
[0%, 29%]
0.00 0.18 .67 5%
[0%, 31%]
Assimilation and contrast effects in 
question sequences (Schwarz, 
Strack, & Mai, 1991)
−0.07 .10 60.39 58 .39 15%
[0%, 33%]
0.10 0.61 .44 17%
[0%, 35%]
0.10 0.00 .97 16%
[0%, 34%]
Cohen's d effect size
Correspondence bias (Miyamoto 
& Kitayama, 2002)
1.82 .00 235.65 57 < .001 65%
[46%, 73%]
0.00 1.47 .23 64%
[45%, 72%]
0.00 2.83 .09 64%
[45%, 74%]
Perceived intentionality for side effects 
(Knobe, 2003)
1.75 .14 631.72 58 < .001 93%
[92%, 97%]
0.10 26.43 < .001 91%
[87%, 95%]
0.14 2.55 .11 93%
[91%, 97%]
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double 
effect (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, 
& Mikhail, 2007)
1.35 .10 131.24 58 < .001 54%
[32%, 66%]
0.10 4.80 .03 51%
[27%, 64%]
0.10 0.13 .72 55%
[32%, 67%]
False consensus: supermarket scenario 
(Ross, Greene, & House, 1977)
1.18 .00 65.54 58 .23 16%
[0%, 41%]
0.00 3.36 .07 12%
[0%, 38%]
0.00 0.26 .61 18%
[0%, 43%]
Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 
2009)
0.95 .10 203.30 59 < .001 73%
[62%, 83%]
0.10 6.02 .01 71%
[58%, 81%]
0.10 0.52 .47 71%
[59%, 82%]
False consensus: traffic-ticket scenario 
(Ross et al., 1977)
0.95 .00 100.19 57 < .001 43%
[18%, 62%]
0.00 0.00 .97 44%
[19%, 63%]
0.00 0.17 .68 46%
[21%, 65%]
Preferences for formal versus intuitive 
reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, 
& Nisbett, 2002)
0.86 .10 156.75 56 < .001 66%
[54%, 81%]
0.10 20.58 < .001 55%
[36%, 73%]
0.10 0.69 .41 67%
[55%, 81%]
Less-is-better effect (Hsee, 1998) 0.78 .10 158.41 56 < .001 65%
[49%, 77%]
0.10 4.68 .03 63%
[46%, 75%]
0.10 1.69 .19 65%
[49%, 77%]
Effect of framing on decision making 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)
0.40 .00 55.20 54 .43 6%
[0%, 36%]
0.00 1.46 .23 3%
[0%, 37%]
0.00 0.20 .66 7%
[0%, 38%]
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic 
status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)
0.40 .24 626.26 63 < .001 89%
[84%, 92%]
0.22 13.01 < .001 87%
[81%, 91%]
0.24 1.64 .20 89%
[84%, 92%]
Moral foundations of liberals versus 
conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009)
0.29 .09 175.26 59 < .001 64%
[49%, 75%]
0.09 0.25 .62 65%
[49%, 75%]
0.09 1.26 .26 65%
[49%, 76%]
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & 
Gilovich, 2008)
0.18 .00 87.82 58 .01 36%
[6%, 54%]
0.00 1.61 .20 34%
[3%, 53%]
0.00 0.53 .47 37%
[7%, 55%]
Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of 
double effect (Hauser et al., 2007)
0.25 .00 60.40 59 .42 12%
[0%, 33%]
0.00 0.90 .34 10%
[0%, 34%]
0.00 0.14 .71 11%
[0%, 31%]
(continued)
Heterogeneity test
All samples (no moderators) WEIRD versus less WEIRD samples Lab versus online samples
Effect ESa Tau Q df p I 2 Tau Q p I 2 Tau Q p I 2
Consumerism undermines 
trust (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & 
Bodenhausen, 2012)
0.12 .00 63.78 53 .15 12%
[0%, 49%]
0.00 0.04 .85 14%
[0%, 50%]
0.00 0.30 .58 15%
[0%, 51%]
Influence of incidental anchors on 
judgment (Critcher & Gilovich, 
2008)
0.04 .00 64.88 58 .25 6%
[0%, 43%]
0.00 0.11 .75 8%
[0%, 44%]
0.00 1.17 .28 4%
[0%, 41%]
Social value orientation and family size 
(Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & 
Joireman, 1997)
−0.03 .00 103.56 53 < .001 50%
[28%, 68%]
0.00 1.15 .28 50%
[28%, 68%]
0.00 1.15 .28 49%
[26%, 67%]
Moral violations and desire for cleans ing 
(Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)
0.00 .00 65.59 51 .08 22%
[0%, 52%]
0.00 1.17 .28 21%
[0%, 52%]
0.00 9.15 < .001 4%
[0%, 46%]
Vertical position and power 
(Giessner & Schubert, 2007)
0.03 .00 62.87 58 .31 3%
[0%, 42%]
0.00 0.00 .96 5%
[0%, 43%]
0.00 6.19 .01 4%
[0%, 35%]
Directionality and similarity (Tversky 
& Gati, 1978)
0.01 .00 15.33 48 .99 0%
[0%, 0%]
0.00 0.42 .52 0%
[0%, 0%]
0.00 0.12 .73 0%
[0%, 0%]
Sociometric status and well-being 
(Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & 
Keltner, 2012)
−0.04 .00 55.09 58 .58 2%
[0%, 30%]
0.00 0.83 .36 2%
[0%, 30%]
0.00 3.21 .07 0%
[0%, 16%]
Priming “heat” increases belief in 
global warming (Zaval, Keenan, 
Johnson, & Weber, 2014)
−0.03 .10 72.96 46 .01 37%
[8%, 63%]
0.10 0.76 .38 37%
[8%, 63%]
0.10 0.50 .48 40%
[11%, 64%]
Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, 
Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 
2014)
−0.02 .00 33.95 51 .97 0%
[0%, 2%]
0.00 3.10 .08 0%
[0%, 0%]
0.00 2.06 .15 0%
[0%, 0%]
Disfluency engages analytic processing 
(Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 
2007)
−0.03 .00 59.46 65 .67 0%
[0%, 27%]
0.00 1.38 .24 0%
[0%, 27%]
0.00 0.91 .34 0%
[0%, 21%]
Effect of choosing versus rejecting on 
relative desirability (Shafir, 1993)
−0.13 .00 51.67 40 .10 26%
[0%, 52%]
0.00 0.55 .46 26%
[0%, 53%]
0.00 0.14 .71 25%
[0%, 50%]
Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 
2001)
−0.08 .00 50.75 59 .77 0%
[0%, 21%]
0.00 0.28 .60 0%
[0%, 22%]
0.00 0.31 .58 0%
[0%, 25%]
Construing actions as choices 
(Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & 
Berlia, 2010)
−0.18 .00 155.49 56 < .001 64%
[47%, 76%]
0.00 3.69 .05 62%
[43%, 74%]
0.00 0.61 .44 65%
[48%, 77%]
Note: Numbers inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. For the tests of moderation, df for Q is 1. Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons suggests alpha = .004 (Slate 1) and alpha = .003 
(Slate 2) as the criteria for statistical significance. Italics indicate significant moderation by the type of sample. Random effects meta-analyses were conducted using the R package metafor (Viechtbauer, 
2010). Between-study variance was estimated using restricted maximum likelihood.
aThis column presents the global effect size (ES) for each tested effect. This information is also presented in Table 4, but it is included here as well so that these values can be easily compared with the estimates of tau.
Table 3. (Continued)
north or south of the many different settings within our 
WEIRD and less WEIRD samples, and that this produced 
the high observed variability. Among the 14 effects that 
were null in the aggregate or in the direction opposite 
the effect in the original WEIRD sample, there was little 
evidence for the original finding in most WEIRD and less 
WEIRD samples. However, in the case of Savani et al.’s 
(2010) effect, both the WEIRD and the less WEIRD rep-
lication samples showed effects that were in the direction 
of the effect in the original Indian sample.
Ultimately, just three effects (those originally reported 
by Huang et al., 2014; Knobe, 2003; and Norenzayan 
et al., 2002) showed significant evidence for moderation 
by WEIRDness after correction for multiple compari-
sons. However, for Norenzayan et al.’s effect, the cul-
tural difference was the inverse of the original result, 
though we note that the original study did not have a 
theoretical commitment regarding the cultural differ-
ence in the condition effect that we tested. Norenzayan 
et al. focused on rule-based responses across conditions 
and predicted that their European American sample 
would show greater rule-based responses than the East 
Asian sample within each condition (see note 5).
Influence of task order
The order in which tasks are presented could moderate 
effect sizes. Across a 30-min session, effects may 
weaken if participants tire or if earlier procedures inter-
fere with later procedures. We did not observe this 
pattern in prior Many Labs investigations with the same 
design (Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2014a), but 
task order remains a potential moderator. Order of 
administration in the current project was randomized, 
so we were able to test this possibility directly. Figure 
4 shows the magnitude of each effect for each position 
in which it was presented in its slate (i.e., from 1, pre-
sented first, to 13 or 15, presented last). For each of the 
28 effects, Table 4 shows the aggregate effect size, the 
effect size when the study was administered first, and 
the effect size when the study was administered last. 
Across the 28 findings, we observed little systematic 
evidence that effects were stronger (or weaker) when 
administered first compared with last. Also, there was 
no evidence of linear, quadratic, or cubic trends by task 
order (for analytic details, see https://osf.io/z8dqs/). 
Examination of all task positions for all 28 findings 
revealed that the aggregate effect size fell outside of 
the 95% CI for 29 of the 394 estimates (7.4%), a percent-
age that is not much different from what would be 
expected by chance (5%). Also, the distribution of the 
significant effects appears to have been relatively ran-
dom across effects and positions (Fig. 4).
Authors of four of the original articles (Alter et al., 
2007; Giessner & Schubert, 2007; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 
2002; Schwarz et al., 1991) noted a priori that their find-
ings might be sensitive to order of administration. How-
ever, there was no evidence for systematic variation in 
magnitude by task order for any of these effects. It is 
still possible that there are specific order effects, such 
as when a particular procedure immediately precedes 
another particular procedure; but these analyses confirm 
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Fig. 4. Effect-size estimates for each study for each position in which it was presented. For comparison, the aggregate effect size for each of the 28 effects is presented 
at the right. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals (CIs). SES = socioeconomic status; SVO = social value orientation; SMS = sociometric status.
Table 4. Comparison of Each Study’s Global Effect Size With Its Effect Size When the Study Was Administered First and 
Last in Its Slate
Effect Global effect size
Effect size in first 
position
Effect size in last 
position
Cohen's q effect size
Disgust sensitivity predicts homophobia (Inbar, 
Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009)
0.05 [0.01, 0.10] 0.01 [−0.16, 0.18] −0.06 [−0.23, 0.11]
Assimilation and contrast effects in question sequences 
(Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991)
−0.07 [−0.12, –0.02] –0.06 [–0.23, 0.12] –0.13 [–0.29, 0.03]
Cohen's d effect size
Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002) 1.82 [1.76, 1.87] 1.88 [1.68, 2.07] 1.63 [1.43, 1.84]
Perceived intentionality for side effects (Knobe, 2003) 1.75 [1.70, 1.80] 1.47 [1.27, 1.66] 1.82 [1.31, 2.03]
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect (Hauser, 
Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007)
1.35 [1.28, 1.41] 1.57 [1.33, 1.81] 1.21 [0.98, 1.44]
False consensus: supermarket scenario (Ross, Greene, 
& House, 1977)
1.18 [1.13, 1.23] 1.22 [1.05, 1.39] 1.12 [0.93, 1.30]
Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009) 0.95 [0.91, 1.00] 1.07 [0.88, 1.26] 1.20 [1.01, 1.39]
False consensus: traffic-ticket scenario (Ross et al., 
1977)
0.95 [0.90, 1.00] 1.05 [0.88, 1.21] 0.93 [0.75, 1.11]
Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning 
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002)
0.86 [0.81, 0.91] 0.69 [0.52, 0.87] 0.71 [0.53, 0.89]
Less-is-better effect (Hsee, 1998) 0.78 [0.74, 0.83] 0.75 [0.56, 0.93] 0.85 [0.66, 1.03]
Effect of framing on decision making (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981)
0.40 [0.35, 0.45] 0.47 [0.26, 0.68] 0.41 [0.21, 0.62]
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status (Huang, 
Tse, & Cho, 2014)
0.40 [0.35, 0.45] 0.31 [0.13, 0.49] 0.35 [0.17, 0.52]
Moral foundations of liberals versus conservatives 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009)
0.29 [0.25, 0.34] 0.47 [0.30, 0.65] 0.31 [0.14, 0.49]
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008) 0.18 [0.14, 0.22] 0.12 [−0.05, 0.29] 0.42 [0.25, 0.60]
Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double effect (Hauser 
et al., 2007)
0.25 [0.20, 0.30] 0.20 [0.002, 0.41] 0.24 [0.04, 0.44]
Consumerism undermines trust (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & 
Bodenhausen, 2012)
0.12 [0.07, 0.17] 0.03 [−0.16, 0.21] 0.14 [−0.03, 0.32]
Influence of incidental anchors on judgment (Critcher 
& Gilovich, 2008)
0.04 [−0.01, 0.09] 0.09 [−0.08, 0.27] 0.05 [−0.12, 0.22]
Social value orientation and family size (Van Lange, 
Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997)
−0.03 [−0.08, 0.02] −0.08 [−0.26, 0.10] −0.11 [−0.30, 0.08]
Moral violations and desire for cleansing (Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006)
0.00 [−0.05, 0.04] 0.01 [−0.18, 0.20] 0.17 [−0.02, 0.36]
Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert, 
2007)
0.03 [−0.01, 0.08] 0.01 [−0.18, 0.19] −0.02 [−0.20, 0.15]
Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978) 0.01 [−0.02, 0.04] 0.13 [−0.01, 0.26] −0.01 [−0.14, 0.12]
Sociometric status and well-being (Anderson, Kraus, 
Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)
−0.04 [−0.09, 0.005] −0.08 [−0.26, 0.10] 0.13 [−0.04, 0.30]
Priming “heat” increases belief in global warming 
(Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014)
−0.03 [−0.09, 0.03] 0.08 [−0.15, 0.30] −0.11 [−0.35, 0.14]
Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin, 
Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)
−0.02 [−0.07, 0.03] −0.01 [−0.18, 0.17] 0.10 [−0.08, 0.27]
Disfluency engages analytic processing (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)
−0.03 [−0.08, 0.01] −0.02 [−0.20, 0.16] −0.10 [−0.28, 0.07]
Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative 
desirability (Shafir, 1993)
−0.13 [−0.18, −0.09] −0.08 [−0.25, 0.09] −0.20 [−0.40, −0.03]
Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001) −0.08 [−0.13, −0.02] −0.12 [−0.30, 0.07] −0.03 [−0.20, 0.14]
Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, 
Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)
−0.18 [−0.21, −0.16] −0.15 [−0.24, −0.06] −0.20 [−0.29, −0.11]
Note: Numbers inside brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Last position was 13 for Slate 1 effects and 15 for Slate 2 effects. The “Global” 
column presents the overall effect sizes ignoring task position.
that the findings, in the aggregate, are robust to task 
order and, particularly, that task order cannot account 
for observation of null effects for any of the nonrepli-
cated results.
Discussion
With protocols that were peer reviewed in advance, we 
conducted preregistered replications of 28 published 
results, collecting data from 125 samples, including 
thousands of participants from locations around the 
world. According to the conventional criterion for sta-
tistical significance (p < .05), 15 (54%) of the replica-
tions provided significant evidence for an effect in the 
same direction as the original. According to a strict 
significance criterion (p < .0001), 14 (50%) of the 28 
replications still provided such evidence—a reflection 
of the extremely high-powered design (for Inbar et al., 
2009, the replication p value was .02). Seven (25%) of 
the replications had effect sizes (Cohen’s d or q) larger 
than the original, and 21 (75%) had effect sizes smaller 
than the original. In the WEIRD samples, the median 
Cohen’s d was 0.60 for the original findings and 0.15 
for the replications—a substantial decline (Open Sci-
ence Collaboration, 2015).8 Sixteen replications (57%) 
had small effect sizes (< 0.20), and 9 (32%) replication 
effects were in the direction opposite that of the origi-
nal finding. Three of the latter (i.e., replications of 
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Schwarz et al., 1991; and 
Shafir, 1993) had an aggregate replication effect size 
that was significantly in the opposite direction accord-
ing to the p < .05 criterion, but only 1 (the replication 
of Shafir, 1993) was significant at the p < .0001 level.
There is no simple decision rule for declaring success 
or failure in replication or for detecting positive results 
(Benjamin et al., 2018; Camerer et al., 2018; Open Sci-
ence Collaboration, 2015). In Table 5, we summarize 
the replication success for each of the 28 global effects 
according to five possible criteria. Each criterion evalu-
ates whether the observed effect size would be consid-
ered statistically significant under different conditions. 
Two criteria used the replication data as reported in 
this article and applied either a loose significance cri-
terion (p < .05) or a strict significance criterion (p < 
.0001). According to these criteria, the success rate was 
54% or 50%, respectively. Other approaches considered 
what the p value would have been if the effect size we 
observed had been obtained with different sample 
sizes: the original study’s sample size, a sample 2.5 
times the original study’s sample size (Simonsohn, 
2015), or 50 participants per group—a reasonably large 
sample compared with historical trends (Fraley & 
Vazire, 2014). With the significance criterion set to p < 
.05 for all three cases, the success rate was 41%, 44%, 
or 35%, respectively. Ten of the effects (36%) were suc-
cessfully replicated according to all the criteria that 
could be applied, and 13 (46%) were unsuccessfully 
replicated according to all the criteria that could be 
applied.9 Five findings (18%) varied in replication suc-
cess depending on the criterion used, usually because 
the replication effect size was substantially smaller than 
the original effect size.
The final column in Table 5 indicates the sample size 
that would be needed to have 80% power to detect each 
original effect given the observed global effect size and 
alpha of .05. Effects that were highly replicable across 
all the criteria were relatively large in magnitude and 
would be relatively efficient to investigate (i.e., they 
would require modest sample sizes: Ns from 12 to 54 
except for one N of 200 and another of 506). Effects 
that were inconsistently replicated across criteria would 
need more substantial sample sizes to study efficiently 
(Ns from 200 to 2,184). Effects that were in the same 
direction as in the original study but too weak for us 
to reject the null hypothesis of no effect with our large 
samples would need massive samples to reject the null 
hypothesis (Ns from 6,283 to 313,958). Finally, for the 
10 findings that had replication effect sizes of 0 or 
replication effects that were in the direction opposite 
the original, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected no 
matter what sample size is used.
The high proportion of failures to replicate, despite 
our extremely large samples, is consistent with the accu-
mulating evidence from other systematic replication stud-
ies (Camerer et al., 2016; Camerer et al., 2018; Ebersole 
et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2014a; Open Science Collabora-
tion, 2015). We cannot identify whether these results are 
due to errors in replication design, p-hacking in original 
studies, or publication bias in which positive results are 
selected despite pervasive low-powered research. How-
ever, it is notable that surveys and prediction markets in 
which researchers predicted and bet on whether these 
original effects would be replicated were effective at pre-
dicting replication success. For example, the correlation 
between market price and replication success for the 
Many Labs 2 studies was .755. These results are reported 
in a separate article (Forsell et al., in press) and replicate 
other studies using prediction markets and surveys to 
predict replication success (Camerer et al., 2016; Camerer 
et al., 2018; Dreber et al., 2016). In any case, these find-
ings provide further justification for improving the trans-
parency of research (Miguel et al., 2014; Nosek et al., 
2015), preregistering studies to make all findings discov-
erable even if they are not published, and preregistering 
analysis plans to make clear the distinction between con-
firmatory tests and exploratory discoveries (Nosek, Eber-
sole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 
Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012).
Table 5. Summary of Replication Success and Failure According to Different Criteria
Effect 
Original 
study’s 
sample size
Replication’s 
sample size
Replication’s 
global effect 
size
Test used to detect 
the effect
Criterion of replication successa
Minimum sample 
needed for 80% power 
to detect the effect 
with alpha = .05b 
Replication’s 
sample size, 
p < .05
Replication’s 
sample size,  
p < .0001
Original 
study’s sample 
size, p < .05
2.5 times 
the original 
sample size, 
p < .05
50 
participants 
per group,  
p < .05
Correspondence bias 
(Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002)
107 7,197 1.82 General linear model 
(main effect)
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 4.65e−9 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 12
Perceived intentionality for side 
effects (Knobe, 2003)
78 7,982 1.75 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 14
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle 
of double effect (Hauser, 
Cushman, Young, Jin, & 
Mikhail, 2007)
2,646 6,842 1.35 Two-tailed Fisher’s 
exact test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 — 20
False consensus: supermarket 
scenario (Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977)
80 7,205 1.18 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 6.98e−6 < 1e−10 5.18e−8 26
Moral typecasting (Gray & 
Wegner, 2009)
69 8,002 0.95 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 1.86e−4 3.06e−9 6.55e−6 38
False consensus: traffic-ticket 
scenario (Ross et al., 1977)
80 7,827 0.95 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 6.06e−5 2.04e−10 6.64e−6 38
Preferences for formal 
versus intuitive reasoning 
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & 
Nisbett, 2002)
157 7,396 0.86 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 < 1e−10 3.92e−5 46
Less-is-better effect (Hsee, 
1998)
83 7,646 0.78 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 6.18e−4 5.76e−8 1.69e−4 54
Effect of framing on decision 
making (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981)
181 7,228 0.40 Two-tailed Fisher’s 
exact test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 .031 6.29e−4 — 200
Cardinal direction and 
socioeconomic status 
(Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)
180 6,591 0.40 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 .080 5.47e−3 .0498 200
Moral foundations of liberals 
versus conservatives 
(Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 
2009)
1,209 6,966 0.29 Fisher’s r-to-z test 
(1 correlation)
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 4.12e−7 < 1e−10 .318 376
Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of 
double effect (Hauser et al., 
2007)
2,612 7,923 0.25 Two-tailed Fisher’s 
exact test
< 1e−10 < 1e−10 4.85e−8 < 1e−10 — 506
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen 
& Gilovich, 2008)
120 8,000 0.18 Two-sample t test < 1e−10 < 1e−10 .325 .119 .369 972
(continued)
Effect 
Original 
study’s 
sample size
Replication’s 
sample size
Replication’s 
global effect 
size
Test used to detect 
the effect
Criterion of replication successa
Minimum sample 
needed for 80% power 
to detect the effect 
with alpha = .05b 
Replication’s 
sample size, 
p < .05
Replication’s 
sample size,  
p < .0001
Original 
study’s sample 
size, p < .05
2.5 times 
the original 
sample size, 
p < .05
50 
participants 
per group,  
p < .05
Consumerism undermines 
trust (Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, & 
Bodenhausen, 2012)
77 6,608 0.12 Two-sample t test < 1e−10 < 1e−10 .594 .399 .546 2,184
Disgust sensitivity predicts 
homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, 
Knobe, & Bloom, 2009)
44 7,117 0.05 Fisher’s r-to-z test 
(2 correlations)
.024 .024 .871 .788 .794 6,283
Influence of incidental anchors 
on judgment (Critcher & 
Gilovich, 2008)
200 6,826 0.04 Two-sample t test .092 .092 .773 .649 .839 19,626
Vertical position and power 
(Giessner & Schubert, 2007)
64 7,890 0.03 Two-sample t test .162 .162 .900 .842 .875 34,886
Directionality and similarity 
(Tversky & Gati, 1978)
144 3,549 0.01 One-sample t test .550 .550 .973 .983 .953 313,958
Moral violations and desire 
for cleansing (Zhong & 
Liljenquist, 2006)
27 7,001 0.00 Two-sample t test .910 .910 .994 .991 .989 NA
Structure promotes goal pursuit 
(Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, & 
Landau, 2014)
67 6,506 −0.02 Welch’s two-sample 
t test
.347 .347 .924 .880 .907 NA
Social value orientation and 
family size (Van Lange, 
Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 
1997)
536 6,234 −0.03 Fisher’s r-to-z test 
(1 correlation)
.183 .183 .697 .537 .908 NA
Disfluency engages analytic 
processing (Alter, Oppen-
heimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)
41 6,935 −0.03 Two-sample t test .171 .171 .917 .868 .870 NA
Priming “heat” increases belief 
in global warming (Zaval, 
Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 
2014)
192 4,204 −0.03 Two-sample t test .274 .274 .816 .712 .866 NA
Sociometric status and well-
being (Anderson, Kraus, 
Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)
116 6,905 −0.04 Two-sample t test .079 .079 .820 .719 .833 NA
Table 5. (Continued)
(continued)
Effect 
Original 
study’s 
sample size
Replication’s 
sample size
Replication’s 
global effect 
size
Test used to detect 
the effect
Criterion of replication successa
Minimum sample 
needed for 80% power 
to detect the effect 
with alpha = .05b 
Replication’s 
sample size, 
p < .05
Replication’s 
sample size,  
p < .0001
Original 
study’s sample 
size, p < .05
2.5 times 
the original 
sample size, 
p < .05
50 
participants 
per group,  
p < .05
Assimilation and contrast 
effects in question  
sequences (Schwarz, 
Strack, & Mai, 1991)
100 7,460 −0.07 Fisher’s r-to-z test 
(2 correlations)
.002 .002 .734 .583 .734 NA
Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & 
Hsee, 2001)
40 7,218 −0.08 Two-tailed Fisher’s 
exact test
.002 .002 .831 .735 — NA
Effect of choosing versus 
rejecting on relative 
desirability (Shafir, 1993)
170 7,901 −0.13 One-sample z test 5.47e−10 5.47e−10 .186 .079 .314 NA
Construing actions as choices 
(Savani, Markus, Naidu, 
Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)
218 5,882 −0.18 Generalized linear 
mixed model with 
a binomial (logit) 
link (main effect)
8.04e−06 8.04e−06 — — — NA
Number of successful 
replications
15 14 11 12 8
Number of unsuccessful 
replications
13 14 16 15 16
Success rate 54% 50% 41% 44% 33%
Note: The effects are ordered by the global effect size of the replication, with the largest effect size first. Negative effect sizes indicate effects in the direction opposite that observed in the original WEIRD (Western, 
educated, industrialized, rich, democratic) sample. If another effect size was used in the original study (e.g., correlation, odds ratio, proportion), that value was transformed to Cohen’s d; two effect sizes (Inbar et al., 
2009; Schwarz et al., 1991) are on a different metric (Cohen's q).
aThese columns present p values calculated on the basis of the observed global effect size in the replication study. For the first two criteria, p values were calculated using the sample size of the replication. For the 
third, fourth, and fifth criteria, p values were calculated under the assumption of other sample sizes: the original study’s sample size, a sample 2.5 times the original study’s sample size, or 50 participants per group. 
Boldface indicates p values that met the indicated criteria for successful replication. Italics indicate that the global effect in the replication was in the direction opposite the effect in the original WEIRD sample. 
Replication success for Savani et al.’s (2010) effect could not be determined using three of the criteria because a p value could not be computed for the test used. Replication success according to the 50-participants-
per-group criterion could not be determined when the test was a two-tailed Fisher’s exact test (four findings), because this would require making strong assumptions about how the sample was distributed in the 2 × 2 
frequency table. bThis column shows the sample size needed for 80% power to detect a significant effect in the same direction as the original given the observed global effect size and alpha = .05. Power analyses were 
conducted using the Cohen's d and Cohen's q values for the replication effect sizes. “NA” indicates that the global effect was in the direction opposite the original finding.
Table 5. (Continued)
The main purpose of this investigation was to assess 
variability in effect sizes by sample and setting. It is 
reasonable to expect that many psychological phenom-
ena are moderated by variation in sample, setting, or 
procedural details, and that this variation may impact 
reproducibility (Henrich et al., 2010; Klein et al., 2014a, 
2014b; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwarz & Strack, 
2014; Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 
2016). However, we found a very strong correlation of 
samples across effects (ICC = .782), and we found a 
nearly zero correlation of effects across samples (ICC = 
.004). As one would expect, knowing the effect being 
studied provides much more information about effect 
size than does knowing the sample being studied. Just 
11 of the 28 effects (39%) showed significant heteroge-
neity according to the Q test, and most of these 11 were 
among the effects with the largest overall magnitude. 
Only one of the near-zero replication effects (Van Lange 
et al., 1997) showed significant heterogeneity with the 
Q test. In other words, if no effect was observed overall, 
there was also very little evidence for heterogeneity 
among the samples.
The I 2 statistic indicated at least medium heterogene-
ity across samples for approximately one third of all 
the effects studied (36%), but almost all the I 2 estimates 
had high uncertainty (i.e., wide confidence intervals). 
Taken at face value, the I 2 statistics in Table 3 indicate 
that heterogeneity in the samples was high for some of 
the findings, even when there was little evidence for 
an effect. For example, for Zaval et al. (2014), the main 
effect was not distinguishable from zero, and 89% of 
the individual samples showed nonsignificant effects, 
which is close to expectation if the samples were drawn 
from a null distribution, and yet the I 2 was 37%. How-
ever, even if the average effect size is 0 and a majority 
of the results are null, there can be strong heterogeneity 
as measured with I 2 (see https://osf.io/frbuv/ for an 
explanation). I 2 compares variability in the dependent 
variable across samples with variability within samples. 
With increasing power, I 2 will tend toward 100% if there 
is any evidence for heterogeneity no matter how small 
the effect. Thus, our I 2 estimates likely reflect our 
extremely large sample sizes rather than the amount of 
heterogeneity in absolute terms.
By comparison, the estimates for tau in Table 3 indi-
cate a small standard deviation in effect sizes for all 
studies except one (tau = .24 for Huang et al., 2014). 
In fact, 19 of the 28 effects (68%) had an estimated tau 
near 0, an indication of minimal heterogeneity, and 8 
(29%) had an estimated tau near .10, an indication of 
a small amount of heterogeneity. It is not so surprising 
that this was the case for the effects that failed to be 
replicated globally, but it was also occasionally the 
case for successful replications. More important, even 
among the successful replications, when heterogeneity 
was observed with tau, it was relatively weak. As a 
consequence, at least for the variation investigated here, 
heterogeneity across samples does not provide much 
explanatory power for failures to replicate.
Our estimates of average effect size and effect-size 
heterogeneity may have been affected by imperfect 
reliabilities of the instruments that measured the out-
come variables. For instance, Hunter and Schmidt 
(1990) showed how imperfect reliabilities attenuate 
effect-size estimates and suggested correcting for these 
imperfections when estimating effect size. As imperfect 
reliabilities were not corrected for in the original studies 
or our replications, systematic differences in effect-size 
estimates between the original and replication studies 
cannot be explained by imperfect reliabilities, unless 
the measurement instruments were systematically much 
less reliable in the replications than in the original stud-
ies; we have no evidence that this is the case. Differ-
ences across labs in reliabilities of measurement 
instruments may also result in overestimation of effect-
size heterogeneity in cases of a true nonzero effect size. 
Insofar as these differences existed in the current inves-
tigation, our results likely overestimate heterogeneity, 
as our analyses did not take imperfect reliabilities of 
variables into account.
For 12 of the 28 effects, moderators or sample char-
acteristics that may be necessary to observe the effect 
were identified a priori by the original authors or other 
experts during the Registered Report review process. 
These effect-specific analyses were reported in the sec-
tion on the individual effects. For 7 of those 12, the 
pooled result was null or in the direction opposite the 
original; for the other 5, the pooled results showed 
evidence for the original finding. Evidence consistent 
with the hypothesized moderation was obtained for just 
1 of the 12 effects (8% of the total; Hauser et al., 2007: 
Trolley Dilemma 1), and weak or partial evidence was 
obtained for 2 (17%; Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002; Risen 
& Gilovich, 2008). For the other 9 (75%), there was little 
evidence that narrowing the data sets to the samples 
and settings deemed most relevant affected the likeli-
hood of observing the effects or the original effect 
magnitudes. This does not mean that moderating effects 
do not occur, but it may mean that psychological theory 
is not yet advanced enough to predict them reliably.
Another possible moderating influence was task 
order. Participants completed their slate of 13 or 15 
effects in a randomized order. It was possible that per-
formance on tasks completed later in the sequence 
would be affected by tasks completed earlier in the 
sequence, either because of the specific content of the 
tasks or because of interference, fatigue, or other order-
related influences (Ferguson, Carter, & Hassin, 2014; 
Kahneman, 2016; Schnall, 2014). Contrary to this pre-
diction, we observed little evidence for systematic order 
effects for the 28 findings investigated. This replicates 
the lack of evidence for task-order effects observed in 
Many Labs 1 (Klein et  al., 2014a) and Many Labs 3 
(Ebersole et al., 2016). Across 51 total replication tests 
(28 reported here; 13 in Klein et al., 2014a; and 10 in 
Ebersole et al., 2016), we have observed little evidence 
for reliable effects of task order. The idea that whether 
a study comes first in a sequence, in the middle, or at 
the end has an impact on the magnitude of the observed 
effect is appealing but, so far, unsupported.
The same is true for effects of administration in lab 
versus online. Since the Internet became a source for 
behavioral research, there has been interest in the 
degree to which lab and online results are consistent 
with one another (Birnbaum, 2004; Dandurand, Shultz, 
& Onishi, 2008; Hilbig, 2016). As is the case for task 
order, across Many Labs projects we have observed little 
evidence for an effect of mode of administration. There 
may be conditions under which it is consequential 
whether a study is administered in the lab versus online, 
but we have not observed meaningful evidence for such 
an impact.
Finally, we included an exploratory analysis of the 
moderating influence of cultural differences between 
WEIRD and less WEIRD samples. We sampled from 125 
highly heterogeneous sources (39 U.S. samples and 86 
samples from 35 other countries and territories) to 
maximize the possibility of observing variation in 
effects based on sample characteristics. Ultimately, we 
found compelling evidence for differences between our 
WEIRD and less WEIRD samples for just three effects 
(those originally reported by Huang et al., 2014; Knobe, 
2003; and Norenzayan et al., 2002).
However, our approach characterized cultural differ-
ences at the most general level possible—a dichotomy 
of WEIRDness—and ignored the rich diversity within 
that categorization. The distribution of WEIRDness 
scores was such that the WEIRD samples were highly 
similar in WEIRDness, and the less WEIRD samples 
varied substantially in WEIRDness. Figure 3 illustrates 
the highly skewed distribution. Countries with scores 
above 0.70 were categorized as WEIRD, and the rest 
were categorized as less WEIRD. Our summary analyses 
also did not address the possibility of highly specific 
regional variations, such as differences between U.S. 
and British samples, nor did they examine why differ-
ences were observed. Nor did these analyses investigate 
many interesting sampling moderators available in this 
data set, such as individual differences, gender, and 
ethnicity. Some moderating influences could be evalu-
ated using the present data set; testing others will 
require new data collections. Also, a true examination 
of WEIRDness would need to more deliberately vary 
sampling across each of the WEIRD dimensions. Further 
analyses of the present data set may inspire hypotheses 
to be tested in future studies.
Implications
It is practically a truism that the human behavior 
observed in psychological studies is contingent on the 
cultural and personal characteristics of the participants 
under study and the setting in which they are studied. 
The depth with which this idea is embedded in present 
psychological theorizing is illustrated by the appeals to 
“hidden moderators” as explanations of failures to rep-
licate when there have been no empirical tests of 
whether such moderators are operative (Baumeister & 
Vohs, 2016; Crisp, Miles, & Husnu, 2014; Gilbert, King, 
Pettigrew, & Wilson, 2016; Ramscar, Shaoul, & Baayen, 
2015; Schwarz & Clore, 2016; Stroebe & Strack, 2014; 
Van Bavel et al., 2016). The present study suggests that 
dismissing failures to replicate as a consequence of 
such moderators without conducting independent tests 
of the hypothesized moderators is unwise. Collectively, 
we observed some evidence for effect-specific hetero-
geneity, particularly for relatively large effects; occa-
sional evidence for cultural variation; and little evidence 
for moderation by procedural factors, such as task order 
and lab versus online administration.
There have been a variety of failures to replicate 
effects that were quite large in the original investigation 
(e.g., Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Hagger 
et al., 2016; Hawkins, Fitzgerald, & Nosek, 2015; Johnson, 
Cheung, & Donnellan, 2014). If effects are highly con-
tingent on the sample and setting, then they could be 
large and easily detected in some samples and negligible 
in other samples. We did not observe this. Rather, evi-
dence for moderation or heterogeneity was mostly 
observed in the large, consistently detectable effects.
Further, we observed some heterogeneity between 
samples, but a priori predictions (e.g., original authors’ 
predictions of moderating influences) and prior findings 
(e.g., previously observed cultural differences) were 
minimally successful in accounting for it. For the effects 
tested in Many Labs 2 at least, it appears that the cumu-
lative evidence base has not yet matured enough for 
moderating influences to be predicted reliably. Simul-
taneously, there is accumulating evidence that research-
ers can predict the likelihood that an effect of interest 
will be replicated (Camerer et al., 2016; Camerer et al., 
2018; Dreber et al., 2016; Forsell et al., in press).
For many multistudy investigations, a common tem-
plate is to identify an effect in a first study and then 
report evidence for a variety of moderating influences 
in follow-up studies. A pessimistic interpretation would 
suggest that this template may be a consequence of 
practices that inflate the likelihood of false positives. 
Consider the context, in which positive results are per-
ceived as more publishable than negative results 
(Greenwald, 1975) and common analytic practices may 
inadvertently increase the likelihood of obtaining false 
positives (Simmons et  al., 2011). In a program of 
research, researchers might eventually obtain a signifi-
cant result for a simple effect and call that Study 1. In 
follow-up studies, they might fail to observe the original 
effect and then initiate a search for moderators. Such 
post hoc searches necessarily increase the likelihood 
of false positives, but finding one may simultaneously 
reinforce belief in the original effect despite failure to 
replicate it. That is, identifying a moderator may feel 
like unpacking the phenomenon and explaining why 
the main effect “failed.”
An ironic consequence is that the identification of a 
moderator may simultaneously increase confidence in 
an effect and decrease its credibility. Investigating mod-
erating influences is much harder than presently appre-
ciated in practice. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA has a nominal 
false positive rate of approximately .30 for one or more 
of its seven tests (1 – .957), yet correcting for multiple 
tests in multivariate analyses is rare (Cramer et  al., 
2016). Also, typical study designs are woefully under-
powered for studying moderation (Frazier, Tix, & 
Barron, 2004; McClelland, 1997), perhaps because 
researchers intuitively overestimate the power of vari-
ous research designs (Bakker, Hartgerink, Wicherts, & 
van der Maas, 2016). The combination of low power 
and lack of correction for multiple tests means that 
every study offers ample opportunity for “detecting” 
moderating influences that are not there.
Ultimately, the main implication of the present find-
ings is a plain one: It is not sufficient to presume that 
moderating influences account for observed variation 
in a phenomenon. Cultural, sample, or procedural vari-
ation could be a reasonable hypothesis as an account 
for differences in observed effects, but it is not a cred-
ible hypothesis until it survives a confirmatory test 
(Nosek et al., 2018).
Limitations
The present study has the strength of data collected 
from very large samples from a wide variety of settings. 
Nevertheless, the generalizability of these results to 
other psychological findings is unknown. Fifty percent 
of the original effects we tested were reproduced, 
which is roughly consistent with the rate of replication 
success in other large-scale investigations (Camerer 
et al., 2016; Camerer et al., 2018; Ebersole et al., 2016; 
Klein et al., 2014a; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 
However, the findings selected for this investigation 
were not a random sample of any definable population, 
nor did they constitute a large sample. It may be sur-
prising that just 50% of the findings were reproduced 
under the circumstances of this project (original materi-
als, peer review in advance, extremely high power, 
multiple samples), but that does not mean that 50% of 
all findings in psychology will be reproduced, or fail 
to be reproduced, under similar circumstances.
This study has the advantage over prior work by 
having included many tests and large samples, to 
achieve relatively precise estimation. Nevertheless, the 
failures to replicate do not necessarily mean that the 
tested hypotheses are incorrect. The lack of an effect 
may be limited to the particular procedural conditions 
of the test. Future theory and evidence will need to 
account for why the effects were not observed in these 
circumstances if they are replicable in others. Con-
versely, the successful replications add substantial pre-
cision for effect-size estimation and extend the 
generalizability of those phenomena across a variety of 
samples and settings.
Data availability
The amassed data set is very rich for exploring the 
individual effects, potential interactions between spe-
cific effects, and alternate ways to estimate heterogene-
ity and analyze the aggregate data. Our analysis plan 
focused on the big picture and not, for example, explor-
ing potential moderating influences on each of the indi-
vidual effects. These would be worthy analyses, but they 
are beyond the scope of a single report. Follow-up 
investigations using these data could provide substantial 
additional insight. For the accompanying Commentaries 
solicited by Advances in Methods and Practices in Psy-
chological Science, we leveraged the extremely high-
powered design of this study to demonstrate the 
productive interplay of exploratory and confirmatory 
analysis strategies. Commenters received a third of the 
data set for analysis. Upon completion of an exploratory 
analysis, the analytic scripts were registered and applied 
to the holdout data for a mostly confirmatory test (Nosek 
et al., 2018). The analysts’ decisions could have been 
influenced by advance observation of the summary 
results in this article, but use of the holdout sample 
reduced other potential biasing influences. Finally, the 
full data set (plus the portions used for the exploratory-
confirmatory Commentaries) and all study materials are 
available at https://osf.io/8cd4r/ so that other teams can 
use them for their own investigations.
Conclusion
Our results suggest that variation across samples, set-
tings, and procedures has modest explanatory power 
for understanding variation in the 28 effects included 
in this project. These results do not indicate that mod-
erating influences never occur. Rather, they suggest that 
hypothesizing a moderator to account for observed 
differences in results between contexts is not equivalent 
to testing moderation with new data. The Many Labs 
paradigm allows testing across a broad range of con-
texts to probe the variability of psychological effects 
across samples. Such an approach is particularly valu-
able for understanding the extent to which given psy-
chological findings represent general features of the 
human mind.
Appendix
Table A1. Included Effects, With Citation Counts
Effect Description of effect and original publication
Citation 
counta
Slate 1
1 Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status: Huang, Tse, and Cho (2014, Study 1a) 6
2 Structure promotes goal pursuit: Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, and Landau (2014, Study 2) 53
3 Disfluency engages analytic processing: Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, and Eyre (2007, 
Study 4)
743
4 Moral foundations of liberals versus conservatives: Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009, 
Study 1)
2,064
5 Affect and risk: Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001, Study 1) 756
6 Consumerism undermines trust: Bauer, Wilkie, Kim, and Bodenhausen (2012, Study 4) 165
7 Correspondence bias: Miyamoto and Kitayama (2002, Study 1) 149
8 Disgust sensitivity predicts homophobia: Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, and Bloom (2009, 
Study 1)
453
9 Influence of incidental anchors on judgment: Critcher and Gilovich (2008, Study 2) 151
10 Social value orientation and family size: Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joireman 
(1997, Study 3)
1,145
11 Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect: Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, and 
Mikhail (2007, Scenarios 1 and 2)
687
12 Sociometric status and well-being: Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, and Keltner (2012, 
Study 3)
250
13 False consensus: supermarket scenario: Ross, Greene, and House (1977, Study 1) 2,965
Slate 2
14 False consensus: traffic-ticket scenario: Ross et al. (1977, Study 1) 2,965
15 Vertical position and power: Giessner and Schubert (2007, Study 1a) 261
16 Effect of framing on decision making: Tversky and Kahneman (1981, Study 10) 17,970
17 Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double effect: Hauser et al. (2007, Scenarios 3 and 4) 687
18 Reluctance to tempt fate: Risen and Gilovich (2008, Study 2) 121
19 Construing actions as choices: Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, and Berlia (2010,  
Study 5)
139
20 Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning: Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett 
(2002, Study 2)
497
21 Less-is-better effect: Hsee (1998. Study 1) 370
22 Moral typecasting: Gray and Wegner (2009, Study 1a) 250
23 Moral violations and desire for cleansing: Zhong and Liljenquist (2006, Study 2) 1,000
24 Assimilation and contrast effects in question sequences: Schwarz, Strack, and Mai 
(1991, Study 1)
475
25 Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative desirability: Shafir (1993, Study 1) 605
26 Priming “heat” increases belief in global warming: Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, and 
Weber (2014, Study 3a)
133
27 Perceived intentionality for side effects: Knobe (2003, Study 1) 847
28 Directionality and similarity: Tversky and Gati (1978, Study 2) 695
aThe citation counts come from Google Scholar on November 6, 2018.
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Measure and source
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location of wealthier people in hometown (for Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)
Not 
applicable
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Subjective well-being: Veenhoven (2009) 33
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Notes
1. Because the project goal was to examine variability in effect
magnitudes across samples and settings, we were not inter-
ested in including studies that were known or suspected to be 
unreplicable.
2. Myriad Web font did support all included languages and was
used consistently in all the locations.
3. The original authors also hypothesized that this effect is
sensitive to task order. If people are already thinking carefully 
(or if they are fatigued), the disfluency manipulation might 
not change how deeply they engage with the syllogism task. 
Therefore, the effect may be most detectable when this task 
is done first. Among participants who performed this task first 
(n = 988), those in the hard-to-read-font condition (M = 49%, 
SD = 77%) and those in the easy-to-read-font condition (M = 
49%, SD = 81%) answered the same percentage of syllogisms 
correctly, t(986) = −0.08, p = .94, d = −0.01, 95% CI = [−0.13, 
0.12]. In addition, when we measured performance using the 
same two syllogisms that Alter et al. (2007) used, we found that 
participants in the hard-to-read-font condition (M = 37%, SD = 
65%) and those in the easy-to-read-font condition (M = 35%, 
SD = 66%) answered similar percentages of syllogisms correctly, 
t(986) = 0.39, p = .70, d = 0.02, 95% CI = [−0.10, 0.15].
4. Zero-order Pearson correlations were not provided in the
original article. They have been computed using the raw public 
data and are based on a total sample of 1,209 participants with 
pairwise complete values (see https://dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/12658&studyListingIndex
=0_775f45d232bb5e430d0024139e25).
5. Norenzayan et al.’s (2002) original study had two key pre-
dictions: (a) All cultural groups would show more rule-based 
responding in the belong-to condition than in the similar-to 
condition, and (b) the European American sample would show 
more rule-based responding than the other samples within 
each condition. The authors observed evidence supporting the 
first prediction, and evidence for the second prediction only 
in the similar-to condition. Across the replication samples, we 
also observed greater likelihood of rule-based responses in the 
belong-to condition compared with the similar-to condition, 
but the WEIRD samples gave more rule-based responses than 
the less WEIRD samples in the belong-to condition (WEIRD: 
M = 65.2%; less WEIRD: M = 59.8%) and fewer rule-based 
responses than the less WEIRD samples in the similar-to con-
dition (WEIRD: M = 42.8%; less WEIRD: M = 48.4%). For an 
explanation of this categorization of the samples, see the intro-
duction to the Results section (pp. 467, 469).
6. The replication effect for Inbar et al. (2009) was categorized
as weakly consistent. The key correlation comparison had a 
p value of .02, and the effect was in the same direction as in the 
original study. The mean difference in perceived intentionality 
between the experimental conditions was not replicated (p = 
.457). In the original study, the mean difference was accounted 
for by the difference between conditions in the correlation of 
disgust sensitivity with perceived intentionality.
7. For the four original studies that used two samples to make
cultural comparisons, we defined the positive direction using 
the effect size observed in the original sample that was more 
Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (i.e., 
more WEIRD).
8. These medians exclude the two studies that used Cohen’s q
for effect-size estimates. Including those, despite the different 
scaling of d and q, yielded similar medians of 0.60 and 0.09, 
respectively.
9. In the case of one original effect (Savani et al., 2010), replica-
tion success could not be computed for three criteria because of 
the test used. The 50-participants-per-group criterion could not 
be used for four additional effects because of the test used. For 
simplicity, we considered only computed tests for this summary.
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